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Abstract  
In studying affect within the realm of student-teacher relationships my thesis 
project use the concept of “affect” as composed by Baruch Spinoza (1992, 2007). I focus 
specifically on how Deleuze (1988) interprets and implements the term within his own 
philosophy, as well as on Antonio Negri’s (2011, 1991) work on Spinoza including his 
and Michael Hardt’s (2000, 2004, 2009) more recent works. This thesis will explore 
Spinoza’s affect within the discourse of Affective Pedagogy and Critical Pedagogy while 
remaining committed to a Spinoizist ontology as outlined by Deleuze (1988). I used 
artefacts from my past experiences as a student and teacher to produce evocative writing 
pieces which act as affective continuances of my past experiences as a student, student-
teacher, and teacher, and the relationships of affect that composed them. This project 
used these artefacts and the writings they produced as sites of intensity that are carried 
through from traces, to evocative thresholds, to concepts, and finally into analysis.   
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  Introduction    
I first read Spinoza’s The Ethics 4 years ago after I found it at the back of a used 
bookstore in St. Catharines. It was priced at $2.50 and was exceptionally old. At the time 
I could vaguely recall the name Spinoza but felt it was probably worth $2.50 so I paid for 
it in change that I just happened to find at the bottom of my backpack. After I got home, I 
opened up its aged and faded cover as gently as possible so as to not further damage its 
deteriorating spine, the likes of which gave off the impression that it had been read by 
thousands of people over hundreds of years.   
I read the first proposition carefully. And then again. “What?’ I said, ‘is this it?”   
I scrolled through the pages looking for something to make sense of and found 
only what seemed like vague terms; ‘substance’, ‘attributes’, ‘affections’? “What a waste 
of bus fare” I thought, and I closed it softly and tucked it away somewhere under the 
stacks of books that I considered much more urgent. After all, I was just a kid from a 
struggling working class town trying to become a teacher in a culture that seemed dead 
set on destroying all educational values in the name of profit, so really, what could a 
reclusive Dutch lens maker from the 1600’s have to say that would somehow make my 
situation any less hostile, or my resilience any less taxed? So I decided I would come 
back to it later, if at all, just so I could at least say that I had read it.   
I picked up The Ethics a second time after coming into contact with the works of 
Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004, 2009), who had frequently referred to Spinoza as often as 
any other thinker, usually in the context of Joy and Love and other concepts that I 
considered overly sappy. Nonetheless, I went back to The Ethics, and once again I found 
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its ideas rang hallow in their seemingly unnecessary complexity. In reality, my ideals as a 
teacher were crumbling, and in the context of anger and arrogance, I just did not have the 
resources nor the patience to take the time to challenge myself to the extent that such a 
detailed and intricately complex piece of work such as The Ethics requires. During this 
time, I was on a mission that was set off by Hardt and Negri’s Empire, in which I sought 
out to uncover all the theoretical roots of their works and then some. From Deleuze and 
Guattari, to Foucault, to Althusser, to the Frankfurt School, to Marx and Nietzsche, I 
gorged on all of them, usually as quickly as possible often reading them multiple times, in 
order to catch up with this large history of ideas that I had stumbled upon and which none 
of my professors seemed overly competent in discussing (according to me that time), and 
all of this at the expense of my actual required school work. And in this endless pursuit of 
ideas, as collectables to support my perspective rather than as works to be unpacked in 
their complexity, I just was not ready to handle what The Ethics really required, which 
was time, patience and old fashioned hard work. Regardless of my intention to outright 
ignore Spinoza (dismissing him as snobby, pretentious, outdated, sentimental) it was 
common for me, during this raging appetite for uncovering the theoretical roots of my 
epoch, to stumble upon Spinoza in other thinkers’ work, and every time I did so I felt like 
he was taunting me, sticking his head where it did not belong.  
Spinoza the ‘saviour’, the ‘great thinker’. Well why was he so great? That crummy old 
yellowed book at the bottom of my piles of my far more esteemed readings.   
The final push came in the form of two works; the first was Antonio Negri’s The  
Savage Anomaly (1981) followed by Gilles Deleuze’s Spinoza: A Practical Philosophy 
(1988), in which both had finally convinced me that Spinoza was a force to be reckoned 
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with and one that I could no longer ignore. Spinoza is a force, and it carries with it 
something that is badly needed: an ontology rooted in the expression of life. Not just a 
critical ideology of an ideology, but an immanent production of ideas and an ethical 
foundation rooted in the grand production of life.  This need however, was not only 
theoretically required, as Negri (1981) points out, but for me a personal necessity as well. 
Thus came the daunting task of an autoethnographic study to explore both of these 
opened avenues of research, the personal and the theoretical, which was challenging for 
me not only because of the vulnerability that open personal self-reflection requires, but 
also the epistemological risks, in that exploring a complicated concept such as affect 
means revaluating how it is we know something and what this can mean for all involved. 
I found I had personal and theoretical questions that needed answering: What is the point 
of teaching and learning in a culture that reduces most systems of meaning or value to 
purely economic ones? How do we as teachers or youth workers prevent the hijacking of 
personal encounters from what benefits them in action, to what benefits an abstract 
system based on control and profit? What is the point of love, of joy, of connecting in a 
world that often seems to have a default setting based on destruction and greed? Where 
do I go from here as an educator or youth work? And what is the point? It was with these 
questions in my mind that I went back to Spinoza with the time and patience his work 
requires, and with the help of Deleuze, Negri, Skott-Myhre and others, I set out to find 
the answers to these specific questions: How does the world manifest itself in the daily 
interactions of teacher-student relationships? And more urgently: How do we reclaim the 
world together through a Pedagogy of Affect?    
  
4 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
CHAPTER ONE  
Literature Review In studying affect within the realm 
of student-teacher relationships this project will use 
the concept “affect” as composed by Baruch Spinoza 
(1992, 2007) in his Ethics (1992) and further 
elaborated in his Theological-Political Treatise 
(2007). This paper focuses specifically on how 
Deleuze (1988) interprets and implements the term 
within his own philosophy, as well as on Antonio 
Negri’s (2011, 1991) work on Spinoza including his 
and Michael Hardt’s (2000, 2004, 2009) more political 
works. When approaching the implementation of 
affect and Spinoza’s ontological repositioning, this 
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paper proposes the use of critical pedagogy (Freire, 
1970; Giroux, 2009, 2011; McLaren, 2009) in 
conjunction with the budding new discourse of 
Affective Pedagogy as defined by Watkins (2006), 
Dahlbeck (2014) and others. In order to unravel the 
way Spinoza defines and uses affect it is important to 
follow its genealogical trajectory through its 
ontological construction in Deleuze (1987, 1988), its 
elaboration by Negri (1980, 2013) through to its 
implementation in educational theory within the 
discourse of Affective Pedagogy. This genealogical 
enquiry, so to speak, constitutes the ontological and 
ethical foundations of the term and is followed by its 
potential implementation into the discourse of Critical  
 Pedagogy.    
According to Deleuze (1988), defining affect in the Spinozist sense is not about 
referring to a static definition of the term but is rather about divesting it from a hierarchy 
of concepts or from the apparatus of institutional forms of knowledge. Deleuze describes 
two methods for reading Spinoza, one being the systematic logical unraveling of a whole, 
or what Deleuze refers to as “affective reading,” a method that is “without an idea of the 
whole, where one is carried along or set down, put in motion or at rest, shaken or calmed 
according to the velocity of this or that part” (p.129). Thus, the definition of Spinoza’s 
affect requires an interpretation through this form of “affective reading”; for it is Spinoza 
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that “teaches the philosopher how to become a nonphilosopher” (Deleuze, 1988, p.130), 
implying that there must be a deinstitutionalizing of disciplinary assumptions to 
understand affect and its potential for student-teacher relations. According to Deleuze, in 
order for one to build an understanding of Spinoza’s affect one must reset the 
transcendent ontology1 of traditional western knowledge (the likes of which Nietzsche 
and other post-structuralists worked against so diligently), and most importantly, replace 
it with a generative or “pure ontology”2 (Deleuze, 1988, p.128).  
 Defining Affect and Affection    
Spinoza’s definition of affect is as follows: “By affect I understand affections of the body 
by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained…” 
(Spinoza, III, def. 3). Thus, Spinoza’s definition of affect is linked with his definition of 
affection, while also, as I will argue further, ontologically grounded. Although the focus 
of this project is on the former, both affect and affection are necessary for a preliminary 
definition of affect, as well as for making clear what I will be referring to as affect’s 
ontological definition. Both affect and affection are by no means undefinable, it is just a 
matter of defining them in their preliminary rigid definitions and then aligning them 
                                                 
1 This is a concept that will be framed later on in the chapter, but for now it is what Hardt and Negri 
(2000) refer to as a form of “Transcendent Apparatus” or metaphysical web that is “capable of disciplining 
a multitude of formally free subjects”. Negri (1980) and Hardt & Negri (2000), propose Spinoza’s ontology 
as an alternative ontology that constitutes thought from the bottom-up as opposed to the top-down 
effect of transcendent ontology.     
2 Aligned with Hardt & Negri (2000), Deleuze (1988) coins the term “pure ontology” in Spinoza: Practical 
Philosophy which is later used by Dahlbeck within the context of Affective Pedagogy, as an ontology of 
generative production of relationships and subjectivities. This will also be further framed later on in the 
chapter.   
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within their ontological capacity; therefore, defining affect/affection is a process that 
involves transitioning from rigid definitions to their role in a larger system of ontology.   
In Deleuze’s excerpts of lectures, titled “Lecture Transcripts on Spinoza’s 
Concept of Affect” (1978/1980/1981), Deleuze explores Spinoza’s concept of affect in 
great detail. The first lecture (1978) begins by outlining a specific definition of affect in a 
very concrete way that is useful for a beginning outline of affect. Once this outline of 
affect, is structured by Deleuze in Lecture 1 (1979) and in his work Spinoza: A Practical 
Philosophy (1988), it is important to then transition this definition into the concepts of 
duration, instantaneousness and infinite extension, which Deleuze (1981) outlines in his 
third Lecture. These concepts are important to defining affect because they act as 
“plugins” of Spinoza’s larger ontological system. By that I mean once affect and affection 
are defined concretely in lecture 1 (1979), Deleuze then introduces ontological concepts 
in Lecture 3 (1981) that act as a contextual charge to the defined terms of affect/affection 
which brings them to life within Spinoza’s larger, more ontological ideas. At this point 
the concepts of affect and affections begin to shift and move within this new ontological 
charge and become what I would term their ontological definitions.   
Affect as a “mode of non-representational thought”  
In Lecture 1 Deleuze (1979) begins defining affect by drawing out Spinoza’s 
distinction between idea and affect/affection. The idea is a representational image or “a 
mode of thought which represents something” (para. 4), a concept of an objective 
material thing, whereas affect represents nothing or is “any mode of thought which 
doesn’t represent something” (para.5). According to Deleuze, affect causes ideas and has 
an idea as its object but never does it represent an objective material thing. Affect does 
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not represent but just is. For example, one may love a person in whatever capacity that 
person decides but the person as an idea is the object not the affect itself. To love 
represents nothing directly, it is an action or force or drive that has a specific object in 
which it is directed. This is why in Spinoza, according to Deleuze (1979), “There is a 
primacy of the idea over the affect for the very simple reason that in order to love it’s 
necessary to have an idea, however confused it may be, however indeterminate it may be, 
of what is loved” (para.7).   
Although affect presupposes ideas and is the cause of them, affect cannot be 
reduced to these ideas or any combination thereof because the “idea and affect are two 
kinds of modes of thought which differ in nature, which are irreducible to one another but 
[are instead] simply taken up in a relation such that affect presupposes an idea, [again] 
however confused it may be.” (Deleuze, 1979, para.9). This is a good start to defining 
affect but leaves lots of unanswered questions. Affect is not a representation of an 
objective thing and it presupposes ideas, and although affect is wholly related to ideas it 
is not reducible to them. Affect comes from and causes ideas but is not reducible to these 
ideas themselves. For Deleuze (1979), Spinoza further complicates things when he 
introduces the concept of “formal reality,” which prepossess that ideas have value in their 
abstracted form as well. This value as an idea in itself either affirms or disaffirms a body 
to joy or sadness. So there is an objective thing or body, and there exists the idea as a 
representation of that body, and this abstract idea itself can be adequate or inadequate 
depending on its cohesion with the causing body, which Deleuze refers to as its “formal 
reality” or what Spinoza refers to as the “certain degree of reality or perfection” 
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(para.10)3. This abstract formal reality is its own attribute separate from the material body 
from which it is derived. The relation of the idea to its exterior body is thus the “extrinsic 
character” of the idea while its abstracted “formal reality” is its “intrinsic character” 
(Deleuze, 1979, para.11).  Deleuze (1979) summarizes this well:   
Just now, when I defined the idea by its objective reality or its representational 
character, I opposed the idea immediately to the affect by saying that affect is 
precisely a mode of thought which has no representational character. Now I come 
to define the idea by the following: every idea is something, not only is it the idea 
of something but it is something, that is to say it has a degree of reality which is 
proper to it. (para. 13)   
   Affect as a “continuous line of variation”  
Furthering this introduced concept of “degree of reality”, Deleuze (1979) states 
that “our ideas succeed each other constantly: one idea chases another, one idea replaces 
another idea for example, in an instant” (para.14). This rapid repetition of ideas affirmed 
in us acts on a continuum or “variation” of one idea being affirmative while another may 
be disaffirming to ourselves and our ability to act. To make this explicit Deleuze (1979) 
uses a concrete example of passing two people on the street named Pierre and Paul. Pierre 
gives a sad impression while Paul gives a joyful impression: “Each one of these ideas in 
relation to me has a certain degree of reality or perfection. I would say that of Paul, in 
relation to me, has more intrinsic perfection than the idea of Pierre since the idea of Paul 
                                                 
3 It is important to distinguish this “formal reality” as a form of value from that of Cartesian 
transcendentalism. Regarding this distinction Deleuze (1988) states “The material of the idea is not sought 
in a representative content but in an expressive content, an epistemological material through which the 
idea refers to other ideas and to the idea of God.” (p.75). Therefore, according to Spinoza, the adequacy 
of an idea is not how accurately it represents its object but in its material expression, a material 
expression that is aligned with “the order and connection of things” in a most truthful manner (p.75).    
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contents me and the idea of Pierre upsets me” (para.19). Thus the more an idea agrees 
with you the more its formal reality or perfection is relevant to your being. This positive 
agreement results in what Spinoza describes as “joy,” in which case “the power of acting 
is increased or improved,” as opposed to the opposite, “sad passions,” in which case the  
“power of acting is inhibited or obstructed” (para.18). It is this process or transition from 
one idea or degree of perfection to another that constitutes affect, which is best 
summarized by Deleuze (1979):   
Spinoza tells us: above all do not believe that affectus (affect) as I conceive it 
depends upon a comparison of ideas. He means that the idea indeed has to be 
primary in relation to the affect, the idea and the affect are two things which differ 
in nature, the affect is not reducible to an intellectual comparison of ideas, affect 
is constituted by the lived transition or lived passage from one degree of 
perfection to another, insofar as this passage is determined by ideas; but in itself it 
does not consist in an idea, but rather constitutes affect (para.18).  
Here affect slips out of representation because it is only in the lived transitions of 
experiences that it exists in sequence which produces ideas either good or bad. Now it is 
here, after distinguishing affect in two major ways: as a “mode of non-representational 
thought” and as a “continuous line of variation” that Deleuze (1979) distinguishes affect 
from affection:   
Affectus [affect] was determined as the continuous variation of the power of 
acting. An affection is what? In a first determination, an affection is the 
following: it’s a state of a body insofar as it is subject to the action of another 
body…Affectio [affection] is a mixture of two bodies, one body which is said to 
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act on another, and the other receives the trace of the first. Every mixture of 
bodies will be termed an affection. (para. 23)         
Therefore here is Deleuze’s (1979) concrete presentation of Spinoza’s affect/affection  
from Lecture 1 in its pre-ontological state:  
1. An Idea is a mode of thought that represents a material objective thing.  
2. An Affect is a mode of thought that does not represent any material thing.   
3. Thus Affect and Idea are two separate things and are not reducible to each other, 
although are in relation (affect produces ideas and ideas produce affect).  
4. Affect produces passions depending on good ideas or bad ideas that have value 
(adequate/inadequate) in themselves in terms of their relations of causing bodies.   
5. A good idea that agrees with a person affirms them to joy.  
6. A bad idea that disagrees with a person affirms them to sadness.   
7. People live in constant succession of ideas that are produced by affects in the 
body along a “line of continuous variation,” going from sad to joy and increasing 
or decreasing their power depending on these two forms of affect and its produced 
ideas.  
8. Affection is a state of encountering bodies that produce ideas of the effects or 
traces of the other body.  
9. Spinoza refers to the ideas produced by affection as affection-ideas and considers 
them inadequate because they are just ideas of effects without their actual cause.  
These are reasonably sound conclusions to be drawn in regards to what it is Spinoza 
means by affect. From these concrete definitions a pedagogy of affect could be described 
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as follows: Affective Pedagogy works to assist students in discerning between good 
affects and bad affects in their continuous line of variation. This interpretation however, 
lacks the ontological weight that Spinoza/Deleuze make available for re-orientating 
educational institutions along lines of affect and affection. In order to prove this claim, I 
will exemplify how affect can function ontologically, by incorporating the concepts of  
Duration, Instantaneousness and Infinite Extension as explicated by Deleuze (1988) in 
Lecture 3.    
Defining Affect Ontologically in accordance with Duration/ Instantaneousness/  
Infinite Extension  
Up to this point it is clear that Deleuze (1981) defines functions of affect very 
simply by claiming that “if one increases the affections of which you are capable, there is 
an increase of power, if one decreases the affections of which you are capable there is a 
decrease of power” (para.21). This either/or of affects as increases and decreases of 
power is fine but not enough to bring in the ontological weight of affect. Deleuze (1981) 
immediately follows this increase/decrease definition with the following: “We can say 
this on the whole (increases/decreases of power) even knowing that it is not always like 
this” (para.21). What does Deleuze mean by this paradox, that is, by making this assertion 
of what affect is followed by its undermining? This is the territory where Spinoza is 
transitioned from static definitions and representations to an ontological praxis, one that 
constitutes a conceptual system of moving parts in constant flux, of which only the 
positive affirmation of life is possible. Because it is here where Deleuze introduces the 
concepts of the instantaneous, duration and infinite extension that the seemingly static 
rationalistic definitions of affect begin to shift.    
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It is with the claim by Deleuze (1981) that “every affection is instantaneous” that 
one finds oneself in new territory in terms of defining affect (para.19). Deleuze then 
states “I would not say that the affects signal the decreases or increases of power, I would 
say that the affects are the decreases or the increases of lived power.” (emphasis added, 
para.19). This doubling of affect, so to speak, is an immersion into the ontology of affect, 
as Deleuze (1981) explains:   
it seems to me that we can understand nothing of the Ethics, that is of the theory 
of the affects, if we don’t keep very much in mind the opposition that Spinoza 
established between the comparisons between two states of the mind, and the 
lived passages from one state to another, lived passages that can only be lived in 
the affects. (para.21)   
It is to understand this “lived passage” component of affect that positions Spinoza’s affect 
into a concept that disrupts and problematizes ontological assumptions about time 
(duration), the individual (extension) and lack (instantaneousness).    
Duration (Time)  
Deleuze incorporates Bergson and his concept of duration to explain affect as a 
lived passage, challenging the ontological assumption of time. By this Deleuze outlines 
duration as the lived passage in between two states. So take two moments both of which 
are abstractions, because there is only one moment ever lived materially, then divide the 
space between them by increasingly smaller amounts, by hours or minutes or seconds; 
one will go on infinitely, never ceasing to completely eliminate space and thus always 
having a certain amount of space between the two states. This infinite in between, 
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according to Spinoza, is not a state but a passage, a lived passage, that can never be 
eradicated; as soon as there are two states or two moments there is always an in between, 
whether it’s an hour or a second and onward infinitely; this never ceasing in-between of 
moments is duration. Deleuze (1988) sets up affect and duration: “it (affect) is not 
confined to the image or idea; it is of another nature, being purely transitive, and not 
indicative or representative, since it is experienced in a lived duration that involves the 
difference between two states” (p.49). Thus Deleuze makes it clear that affect is not a 
comparison of two states, but the material lived passage between those two states as 
duration.      
Instantaneous (Lack)  
It is instantaneous that leads Spinoza to claim “I am as perfect as I can be 
according to what I have in the instant” (Deleuze, 1981). According to Deleuze it is 
important to recall that this instantaneous essence is a state of immediateness, and what 
Spinoza emphasizes is that affect is not the comparison of two states, but rather the lived 
passage from one to the other that constitutes affect. Recall here the quote above about 
affect not being a “signal” of increases or decreases of power but the lived passage itself. 
Affections on the other hand are the relations of bodies that compose a body in the 
moment of now. Deleuze (1981) sets up a metaphor for this. If you are alone in a dark 
room, the immediate context of the dark room is your affection, or the context of relations 
of bodies in which you find yourself now. Then the light is turned on and startles you, 
this infinite transition from dark to light is duration or affect while the new instant context 
of the lighted room is your affection. Affection is thus instantaneousness, it is the context 
of bodies in which we are related at one moment while the experiencing of these bodies is 
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affect. Thus a person never lacks anything because they are materially produced by the 
relations of bodies (affection) and the affects that these bodies/affections produce.    
Extension (Individual)  
According to Spinoza we are an embedment of relations of bodies. Spinoza says  
“a very large number of extensive parts belongs to me. Hence I am affected in an infinity 
of ways” (Deleuze, 1981). Our bodies are thus composed of infinite parts, from our 
organs as bodies to the atoms that constitute them and everything else; thus nothing is 
separate and there is no affection from a distance. There is no empty space – no great 
void. Life is infinite bodies moving in infinite cause and effect relationships, always 
composing new relations and shifting expressions. Thus every “person” is a composition 
of an infinite extension of infinite parts both within to an infinitesimal level and outwards 
to an infinite extension; there is nothing immaterial about this, these are infinite material 
parts or bodies in infinite extension (Deleuze, 1981).      
What is so challenging about these terms and how they interact (Duration, 
Instantaneousness, Extension) is that they challenge many fundamental assumptions we 
hold as productive citizens of late capitalism: for example, Time (see Casarino, 2003),  
Individual (see Negri, 2013), and Lack (see Deleuze & Guatari, 1977), to name a few.  
These social constructions of late capitalism are what Spinoza would refer to as 
“superstitions” that compose the “institutions of sadness.” Tackling these fundamental 
assumptions is what marks Spinoza as ontological, in that it does not destroy the fabric of 
human knowledge but exposes it as what is, a purely constructive process that can either 
be directed towards joy and emancipation or sadness and oppression. There is no 
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presocial individual for Spinoza; as soon as we come into this world we are enmeshed in 
a web of bodies with a history (a material trajectory as much as affirmed habits of 
behaviour) until we finally decompose our relations into death (Clough, 2010).   
Why Ontology and Education?  
In their work, Commonwealth, Heart and Negri (2009) conclude with a final 
chapter subtitled “Instituting Happiness”. The two thinkers summarise their seminal 
political critique with a hopeful inquiry into what is to be done next, or, more accurately, 
now. Considering the density and scope of their series of works, from the preludes of 
Negri’s The Savage Anomaly (1981) and Insurgency (1996) to their ground-breaking joint 
effort of Empire (2000) and onwards, on the surface this concluding chapter seems overly 
pragmatic if not downright sentimental. It is because of this immediate impression, which 
is a superficial reading, that I believe it is the best place to begin for approaching the 
subject of what opportunities there are for affective pedagogy within its political context, 
while also outlining the ontological tools that Hardt and Negri equip us with, the most 
challenging and fundamental of which is Spinoza’s ontology and its immanent 
possibilities.   
In their concluding chapter Hardt and Negri propose what most mainstream 
educational theorists do, that any kind of claim to a theory of education is also a claim to 
a theory of socio-political orientations, meaning that to inquire about what it entails to 
teach is to inquiry about what it entails to be social and political. This contextualising of 
education within its larger socio-political context is what Dewey (1932) and more 
critically Freire (2005) emphasize as fundamentally necessary in any serious approach to 
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pedagogy.  Even teaching methods that are based on self-proclamations of non-political 
pedagogy are saturated in market-driven ideologies of what it means to be a “citizen” or 
“consumer” or “productive”, and all within technocratic and psychological 
epistemologies of control (eg. Kincheloe, Pinar, Giroux).   
It is clear that there is no escaping the political when engaging with the 
educational. What constitutes the abstract roles of a student and the roles of the teacher 
and their relationships to each other, is to discover that this process of abstraction is 
equivalent to the process of abstraction from body to citizen – worker – woman, or what  
Deleuze refers to as “becomings,” and what it means to play these abstract roles that are 
codified be ideological discourses. It is this engagement, or “micro-politics,” that thinkers 
such as Deleuze, Guattri, Foucault and others, help navigate (Gatens 1996), whether this 
navigation is the technologies of the self, the multiplicity of desire, or the ontological 
expression of life in contrast with the apparatuses that seek to appropriate it (Hardt & 
Negri, 2000). This intricate and complicated entanglement of bodies and the affects they 
produce is where teaching and learning really happens.   
In this final chapter Heart and Negri (2009) link education with the concept of 
human nature:   
Human nature similarly is not immutable but rather open to a process of training 
and education. This does not mean that there are no limits to what we can do or 
that we can break absolutely from the past to create a clean slate…What it does 
mean, though, is that change is possible at the most basic level of our world and 
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ourselves and that we can intervene in this process to orient it along the lines of 
our desires, toward happiness (p.378).   
Cynicism at its worst is the entrenched certainty that we are all biologically determined 
according to certain transcendent absolutes, it is the robbing of our capacity to create, and 
the blocking of the infallible fact that we are infinite in our relations and our abilities to 
transform them. This is the project that Spinoza ontology prepares us for, equipped with 
an ontology or what Negri refers to as a “constituent ontological praxis,” gives us the 
conceptual tools to tackle the ever-present now, because the most mendacious ideology is 
the one that denies us the immediacy of action, of creative transformation, of the only 
thing we can truly claim to own – our capacities to affect and to be affected.   
What is Ontology?  
In their chapter, “Rethinking Critical Theory and Qualitative Research”, 
Kincheloe and McLaren (2005) describe ontology as an intersection of epistemology and 
being.  An ontology, according to the authors, is a set of parameters about life or reality 
that one uses as reference points (common concepts include truth, being, the self ect.). It 
is not about proving my ontology to be correct but about analyzing how it comes to be 
and what characterizes its processes. It is like shining a spotlight on a phenomena that 
strips that phenomena bare to its most basic assumptions and it is up to the researcher to 
inquirer about how the assumptions are constructed and why. It is making bare all the 
deep epistemological pillars that uphold a specific ideology or process of thought which 
constitute human behaviour at least partially (Kinchole & Mclaren 2005).    
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At its most basic description ontology is the inquiry of what it means to be or 
“being”. Ontology is primarily associated with the disciplinary tradition of philosophy, 
and its origins are most notably attributed to Aristotle and his Metaphysics. It was in the  
Metaphysics that Aristotle drew out the infamous inquiry of “being qua being” as its own 
conceptual pursuit separate from physical scientific studies. The pursuit of being in and of 
itself remained one of the cornerstones of philosophical insights in the history of ideas 
capitulating with Heidegger’s “being and time” (Jacquette 2002). Heidegger is seen as 
bringing “phenomenology back to classical ontology” in a “brooding reflection over the 
failure of modernity and destruction of its values” (Negri 2009, p.29). The linguistic turn 
of philosophical thought in the second half of the 20th century and its reflection on 
traditional philosophical tools such as language, power and oppression, revealed the 
limitations of these dominant philosophical discourses while also exposing these traditional 
ontological questions of being as forms of transcendent ontology (Jameson, 2001).  
   Transcendent Ontology    
Hardt and Negri (2000) refer to transcendent ontology as a “Transcendent  
Apparatus” that is “capable of disciplining a multitude of formally free subjects,” and, 
according to Hardt and Negri (2000), historically philosophers have simply disputed 
“where this mediation was situated and what metaphysical level it occupied, but it was 
fundamental that in some way it be defined as an ineluctable condition of all human 
action, art and association.” (p.78). From Descartes, Kant, and Hegel there has always 
been a tight relationship between modern European politics and metaphysics, as Negri  
(2000) puts it: “Politics resides at the center of metaphysics because modern European 
metaphysics arose in response to the challenge of the liberated singularities and the 
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revolutionary constitution of the multitude” (p. 83). Thus, Transcendent Ontology 
essentially acts a form of appropriation, one that acts through abstract representations in 
order to condition bodies and the relations that compose them (Negri, 2000). For 
example, within schools, bodies are abstracted to the roles of ‘students’ or ‘teachers’ and 
are punished for deviating from these forms of representation. What this appropriation 
does, as transcendent ontology, is immediately contain any form of possibility of 
different relations (both meaningful and hostile) and the ontological production that these 
relationships could possibly generate. The question to be posed now then, is how can we 
as educators and students out maneuver this intimate form of appropriation and what 
tools does Spinoza offer us?       
Spinoza’s Ontology  
In The Savage Anomaly, Antonio Negri (1980) claims that Spinoza offers an  
“ontological philosophy of praxis” (p.125) or “the constitution of collectivity as praxis”  
(p.21), while also mapping out how the radical potential that Spinoza’s ontology offers, is 
subsumed and appropriated (transcendent ontology) within the academic and political 
discourses that contextualize Spinoza during his particular historical epoch as well as in 
the present one, a process that leads to what Negri refers to as “Spinozism”. This is the 
general theme of Negri’s The Savage Anomaly, but it is also the cornerstone of his later 
works, in that this infinite ontology versus contextual appropriation is a theme extended 
and enriched in his later works (1996, 2000, 2004, 2009). But what is this “ontology” that 
Negri deems to be the true interpretation? And why has it been continuously dismantled 
and appropriated? And what use is it for contextualising affect?  
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Transcendent ontology is configured as a fundamental component within Hardt 
and Negri’s theory of Multitiude (2004) and Empire (2000). Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004, 
2009) outline that abstracting ourselves into static representations and conditioning our 
behaviour and relationships to those ideas is not only a fundamental tool for 
appropriation, but is also fundamentally backwards in terms of configuring any form of 
liberating political practices.  In this context people rely on assumptions and stereotypes 
as points of reference for their own patterns of thought and action; it is what Freire (2005) 
would label as a disengagement of subjectivity.  What Spinoza provides, according to  
Negri (1981, 2013) and Deleuze (1988), as well as many others (Ruddick, 2010; Gatens,  
1996; Williams, 2010), is that Spinoza’s ontology is a way out of this habit of 
appropriation. Ruddick (2010) outlines the potential of Spinoza’s ontology: “the 
conception distinguishes between innate power and domination/alienation, providing 
contemporary Marxists and post-Marxists with a basis for understanding resistance as 
something more than a reaction-formation to the oppressive capacities of capitalism or 
other structures of oppression.”(p.25). This is done specifically through two fundamental 
concepts Negation (and its eradication) and the plane of immanence.   
Negation  
Spinoza offers a way out of mediation, or a way out from negative thought. 
Hobbes for example, suggests that human nature must be mediated or negated by a 
sovereign power, a leviathan. A summary of Hobbes in this context would be: life is too 
chaotic and dangerous to be left to its own devices and must be controlled through an 
external sovereign body of power. The mediation is thus the ceasing of an expansive form 
of human nature, of life. It is used as a way to take human production (in its natural form) 
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and entrap it into the political context of certain historically specific forms of 
productionrelations. For Spinoza, life is its own form of production while capitalism’s 
employee/employer relation of production offers only a historically specific and 
restrained idea of production. This transition from life production to capitalist production 
is what Negri (1980) refers to as the functioning of “bourgeois ideology”. According to 
Spinoza, life needs no mediation or appropriation of its forces of production. Spinoza’s 
ontology is also not a metaphysical construction based on representation that is needed to 
contain life and its forces, but is instead an affirmation of life and its infinite capacity 
(Deleuze 1998, Negri 1980). The idea of something (or its being) is not more important 
or real than its material object.   
Plane of Immanence (Pure Ontology)  
The rejection of negation by Spinoza is fundamentally linked with the plane of 
immanence. It is why Deleuze claims that “there has never been but a single ontology. 
There is only Spinoza who has managed to pull off an ontology. If one takes ontology in 
an extremely rigorous sense, I see only one case where a philosophy has realized itself as 
ontology, and that’s Spinoza” (1981, para. 25). This is also what Dahlbeck (2014) refers 
to as a “pure ontology,” a creation of concepts that are most accurately associated with 
the material bodies that produce them through affects. There is no mediation, negativity 
or appropriation of ideas but only the affects and the material bodies that produce them. 
In this context life operates as a smooth surface. According to Gatens (1996) what the 
plane of immanence offers is “a commitment to thinking against fundamental 
propositions of humanist philosophy, namely, that sociability requires the organization of 
an individual’s natural affects by a power that transcends the natural conditions” (p.164). 
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Gatens (1996) outlines that what this humanist philosophy, or what this paper has referred 
to as transcendent ontology, does, is divide the material plane or the one of nature from 
the transcendent plane of thought that is used to organize and control the former. What 
Spinoza offers, as outlined by Deleuze and Guattari (1995), is univocity of being, in that 
thoughts are simply expressions of affects and the relations of material bodies. Spinoza’s 
ontology divides the transcendent plane and material plane but only in that they are both 
deemed as attributes (thought and extension) but remain connected as one nature or 
substance. Gatens (1995) summarizes this well: “Reason, or the power of thought, thus 
cannot be seen as a transcendent or disembodied quality of the soul or mind but rather 
reason, desire and knowledge are embodied and express, at least in the first instance, the 
quality and complexity of the corporal affects” (p.166).    
Affect within Spinoza’s Ontology  
 In Spinoza: a Practical Philosophy, Deleuze (1988) outlines Spinoza’s 
ontological and ethical paradigms with great lucidity and constitutes the term affect 
within the plane of immanence. Deleuze distinguishes between the common 
interpretation of Spinozian affection (affectio) and affect (affectus) from what he 
considers thinks is the more legitimate one. The common interpretation positions the two 
terms within the mind/body dichotomy of transcendent ontology, affection being the 
affect of the body and affectus being the affect of the mind. This interpretation, however, 
fails to capture the complexity of Spinoza’s affect and also re-appropriates it into the 
dominant Cartesian paradigm of Spinoza’s historical period, a paradigm which Spinoza 
worked so diligently to undermine (Jarret 2007). Deleuze (1988) makes clear how these 
two terms of affect work within both the body and mind holistically:   
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The affectio refers to a state of the affected body and implies the presence of the 
affecting body, whereas the affectus refers to the passage from one state to 
another, taking into account the correlative variation of the affecting bodies.  
(p.49)  
Here Deleuze (1988) makes the distinction that affect does not influence the mind or 
body independently, but rather a positioning of an affective body within relation(s) to 
another affecting bodies. Spinoza breaks down the mind/body dichotomy specifically in  
Part II, proposition 13, of The Ethics where he claims that “the object of the idea 
constituting the human mind is the body – i.e. a definite mode of extension actually 
existing. And nothing else.” (p.71). Spinoza explains further that we “have ideas of the 
affections of a body. Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a 
body, a body actually existing” as “the human Mind is united to the Body” (p.65). This 
reorientation of mind/body by Spinoza is referred to as “parallelism” and is fundamental  
 to Spinoza’s generative ontological paradigm, as Deleuze (1988) elaborates:    
The practical significance of parallelism is manifested in the reversal of the 
traditional principle on which Morality was founded as an enterprise of 
domination of the passions by consciousness. It was said that when the body 
acted, the mind was acted upon, and the mind did not act without the body being 
acted upon in turn (the rule of the inverse relation, cf. Descartes, The Passions of 
the Soul, articles 1 and 2). According to the Ethics, on the contrary, what is an 
action in the mind is necessarily an action in the body as well, and what is a 
passion in the body is necessarily a passion in the mind. There is no primacy of 
one series over the other. (p.18)       
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This parallelism is what lays the groundwork for Spinoza’s ontology and ethics, which 
provides the context for truly affective relationships within the Spinozian/Deleuzian 
understanding of the term. By undermining the traditional mind over body dichotomy, 
Spinoza reconstitutes morality from the bottom up, in that morality is no longer the 
divine law of good and evil but a rigorous ethics of good and bad, or, as Spinoza phrases 
it, “joy” versus “the sad passions”; this is an ontological reversal from the judgement of 
the sovereign power to a generative expression, or, as Deleuze (1988) puts it: “There is, 
then, a philosophy of ‘life’ in Spinoza; it consists precisely in denouncing all that 
separates us from life, all these transcendent values that are turned against life” (p.26).  
Affect and Bodies  
Within this new generative ontological paradigm presented by Spinoza and further 
articulated by Deleuze, lies the ethical foundation of affect. According to Spinoza “we do 
not know what the body can do” (as cited in Gregg & Seigworth, 2010), a statement set in 
the conceptual transitions from subjects of sovereign power to “a singular essence, which 
is to say, a degree of power” (Deleuze, 1988, p.27). This de-essentialism of the individual 
is not to suggest that human bodies are limitless in their own right necessarily, but rather 
that their engagement with other bodies and environmental conditions remain limitless in 
their capacities to affect one another as assemblages (SkottMyhre, 2008).  In this new 
understanding of bodies, affect breaks free from limited essentialized beings and becomes 
relational between bodies contained by capacities to be affected and to affect other bodies 
in either an empowering act of composition or a disempowering act of decomposition. It 
is within this ontological relation of bodies as modes with certain capacities of affect that 
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we find the definition of Spinoza’s affect so important. Deleuze (1988) articulates this 
well:  
Thus the power of acting varies according to external causes for the same capacity 
for being affected. The feeling affect (joy or sadness) follows from the image 
affection or idea that it presupposes (the idea of the body that agrees with ours or 
does not agree); and when the affect comes back upon the idea from which it 
follows, the joy becomes love, and the sadness, hatred. In this way the different 
series of affections and affects continually fulfill, but under variable conditions, 
the capacity for being affected. (p.50)    
Deleuze’s Spinoza   
“There are many Spinozas, just as there are many Platos and Hegels, and Deleuze’s  
Spinoza is a Spinoza read through the eyes of Friedrich Nietzsche” (Surin, 2005, p.261).  
The breaking of negativity, mediation or transcendent ontology by Spinoza is 
further outlined in Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy. In describing Nietzsche’s 
concept of Will to Power, Deleuze (1962/1983) claims the following: “It follows that will 
to power is manifested as a capacity for being affected” (p.62). Then Deleuze integrates 
affect as ontologically ingrained when he claims that “This capacity [of affect] is not an 
abstract possibility, it is necessarily fulfilled and actualised at each moment by the other 
forces to which a given force relates”; here again we see Deleuze’s assertion that affect is 
not abstract, it is not a representation but an ingrained sense of every moment, or later a  
“lived passage” caught up in the flow of duration, within the infinite extension of bodies.   
It is appropriate that here, in Nietzsche and Philosophy, when speaking of affect  
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Deleuze once again refers to Spinoza:   
Spinoza, in an extremely profound theory, wanted a capacity for being affected to 
correspond to every quantity of force. The more ways a body could be affected 
the more force it had. This capacity measures the force of a body or expresses its 
power. And, on the one hand. This power is not a simple logical possibility for it 
is actualised at every moment by the bodies to which a given body is related. On 
the other hand, this capacity is not a physical passivity, the only passive affects 
are those not adequately caused by the given body (p.62).     
Tools of affect are given by Nietzsche and spoken through Deleuze (1962), those 
conceptual tools being that affect is a capacity within the relations of forces, where being 
is becomings in the driving forces of the Will to Power within the Eternal Return. 
According to Deleuze, what this provides is a way out of the dialectic of thought or the 
dominant discourses of Spinoza’s superstitions or Negri’s “mediations of bourgeois 
ideology.” Deleuze explains this: “Nietzsche’s practical teaching is that difference is 
happy: that multiplicity, becoming and chance are adequate objects of Joy by themselves 
and that only joy returns” (p.190).  
Affect “Theory”: Ethology of what a body can do  
In Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg’s introduction to their edited volume 
titled “The Affect Theory Reader” the authors outline the emerging field of affect studies 
in social theory and abroad. The collection includes work by Massumi, Clough and  
Watkins and provides a good overview of the current research areas in “affect theory”; 
more specifically the introduction of coming to terms with the very notion of having a 
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theory of affect and what that may be is of significant relevance. For Seigworth and 
Gregg (2010) it is not what affect or affect theory is that should concern theorists of 
affect but instead what it can do.   
To elaborate on this shift from content to action of affect, the two editors reiterate  
Spinoza’s famous line “no one has yet determined what the body can do” (as cited in 
Seigworth & Gregg, 2010, p.3) in order to emphasize that affect remains within the 
continuous unraveling of what it is exactly the body or bodies can do, and how one can 
use it to map out this infinite domain of bodies. The two editors also outline how a 
discourse of affect theory could reveal itself within the context of the ever unknown 
body:  
But, as our contributors will show, affect’s impinging/extruded belonging to 
worlds, bodies, and their in-betweens – affect in its immanence – signals the very 
promise of affect theory too: casting illumination upon the ‘not yet’ of a body’s 
doing, casting a line along the hopeful (though also fearful) cusp of an emergent 
futurity, casting its lot with the infinitely connectable, impersonal, and contagious 
belongings to this world. (p.5)      
Deleuze/Spinoza refer to this mapping of what affect can do as an ethics or Ethology. For 
Spinoza, it would make more since to map out the modes not in regards to transcendent 
concepts like ‘species’ or what is, but rather as their potential capacities to affect and be 
affected or what it is they can do (Deleuze 1988: Gatens 1996). Moira Gatens (1996) 
outlines that “Ethology does not impose a plane of organization but rather posits a plane 
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of experimentation, a mapping of extensive relations and intensive capacities that are 
mobile and dynamic” (p.169). Seigworth and Gregg outline their affect as follows:  
Affect arises in the midst of inbetween-ness: in the capacities to act and be acted 
upon. Affect is an impingement or extrusion of a momentary or sometimes more 
sustained state of relation as well as the passage (and the duration of passage) of 
forces or intensities. That is affect is found in those intensities that pass body to 
body (human, nonhuman, par-body, and otherwise), in those resonances that 
circulate about, between, and sometimes stick to bodies and worlds, and in the 
very passages of variations between these intensities and resonances themselves.  
(p.1)  
Within this context of “Affect theory,” in displaying what it is affect can do, it is worth 
outlining a few theorists who have done just that, and whose display of affect are of value 
to this project. In her article “Affective processes without a subject: Rethinking the 
relation between subjectivity and affect with Spinoza,” Caroline Williams (2010) 
characterises affect in the Spinozist sense as “conceived as both a power to affect and be 
affected, and the political body itself the elemental site of transformation and production” 
(p.246). In sequence with this definition, Williams carves out a similar methodology to  
Seigworth and Gregg’s focus of what affect can do; for example Williams states: “My 
aim, however, is to think with and through Spinoza rather than simply interpret aspects of 
his philosophy and political thought, and I utilise his ontology to reflect on the dynamic 
of the political” (p.247). Thus Williams is therefore very much in the spirit of a 
generative ontology or a constituted praxis in exhibiting what is she can make affect do.   
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In Susan Ruddick’s (2010) article, “The Politics of Affect: Spinoza in the Work of 
Negri and Deleuze,” the author uses a Spinozist framework to investigate affect and its 
potential in regards to “the ontological divide that difference (alterity) presents and the 
ways we deal with the discomfort that often arises when attempting to bridge it” (p.22).  
Ruddick’s goal is to use Deleuze and Negri’s work on Spinoza, specifically the concept 
of affect, to provide a theoretical framework that seeks to work to reengage dynamic 
subjectivities in the pursuit of “immanent production of new subjectivities” (p.22).  
Ruddick opens up interesting themes regarding the different ways Deleuze (primality 
through desire) and Negri (primarily through the multitude) integrate Spinoza’s theory of 
affect and how these separate projects constitute affect. Ruddick (2010) also summarizes 
the relation between body and idea quite well:  
Thinking then is immediately implicated in the production of new ideas and new 
unions. But thought does not proceed outwards from the cogito, nor is it inscribed 
in transcendent principles: it is a social act emerging in combination. The body 
‘itself’ – whether a social body or individual human being – is in a constant state 
of de- and re-composition in relation to other bodies, even in the most mundane 
acts of everyday reproduction. It becomes aware of itself in relation to the trace – 
the effect of other bodies upon it. Its awareness is the product of a multiplicity of 
encounters whose meanings themselves are deeply invested in the materiality of 
the social field. (p.28)  
 Moira Gatens (2010) also engages with Deleuze and Spinoza in her chapter titled  
“Through a Spinozist Lens: Ethology, Difference, Power” by engaging in possibilities of 
new forms of feminism through the actions of Deleuze and Guattari’s micro-politics. 
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Gatens (2010) goal is to help weave through the cultural component of feminism with the 
material actions of being feminist within the new parameters of Spinoza/Deleuze’s plane 
of immanence.   
Affective Pedagogy  
Megan Watkins (2006) is often cited as being one of the founders of engaging 
Spinoza’s affect within educational theory (Dahlbeck, 2014; Mulcahy, 2013). In her 
article, “Pedagogic Affect/Effect: Embodying a Desire to Learn,” Watkins (2006) plugs 
the “Deleuzian/Spinozistic” term of affect into the discourse of pedagogy and educational 
theory. Watkins conceptualizes affect as “understood from a Deleuzian/Spinozistic 
perspective as force or capacity” (p. 270). Watkins uses the work of Gibbs (2002) and 
Newton (2003) to explore the biological studies of affect within the realm of the physical 
body, while also attempting a reconfiguration of affect into Vygoskian social psychology. 
Watkins is careful to distinguish between affect and emotion, unlike many (see Ahmed,  
2004; Boler, 1996) in the biological field who tend to clump the two together (as cited in 
Watkins 2006). Watkins (2006) describes her use of affect as a tool to redefine the classic 
binaries of mind/body and unconscious/conscious. Watkins (2006) describes this attempt: 
It involves not simply focusing on nature/culture and individual/society but the relations 
of mind/body and consciousness/unconsciousness in reconceptualising being, so crucial 
in theorising pedagogic practice. Affect provides a useful mechanism for doing this. The 
notion of affect I want to pursue does not deny its biological realisation; rather, it is more 
the case that I want to broach this dimension of affect from a philosophical perspective as 
an ontological issue. (pp.  
271-272)  
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Watkin’s choice here to frame affect as an “ontological issue” outlines the significant 
weight that Spinoza’s affect brings with it and is why her conceptualising of the term is 
so important. What Watkins (2006) and others such as Zembylas (2007) make clear is 
that without the ontological weight of Spinoza/Deleuze there is no true affect, because it 
allows the term to fall back into the domain of emotional intelligence or other 
psychological concepts. Watkins (2006) describes the goal of affect as being to enhance  
“those practices that are most effective in equipping students with the skills they require 
for academic success [emphasis added] ” (p.275). Watkin’s (2006) choice to 
conceptualize the term affect ontologically is perhaps undermined by her attempt to place 
it within the confines of institutional knowledge. By this I mean Watkins’ (2006) main 
goal is to reaffirm the teacher as a fundamental position within education in the wake of 
what she feels is a presumptuous shift into student centered claims of pedagogical 
practice, which is why she attempts to plug affect into Vygotsky’s social psychology, a 
theory that emphasizes teacher orientated scaffolding. Watkins (2006) sums up this 
attempt:  
Without adequate and sustained teacher direction, as is often the case with 
progressivist approaches such as whole language, affect is far more fleeting, 
lacking the force to ensure the appropriate impact on students’ bodies and minds 
and their potential capacitation. Although not framed in terms of a theory of 
affect, Egan and Gajdamaschko (2003), who examine the teaching of literacy 
from a Vygotskyian perspective, hold a similar view concerning the lack of 
teacher direction within whole language (p.275)  
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If there was a psychological theory that could see the generative ontological force of 
affect be utilized, Vygotsky’s would seem to be the best choice. Watkins points out that 
Vygotsky saw Spinoza’s ontology as a “much sounder ontological basis from which to 
theorise the impact of affect on consciousness and children’s overall mental 
development” (p. 276). However, Watkins (2006) goal of institutionalizing affect and its 
ontological paradigm rather than applying affect in all its ontological weight leaves open 
this avenue for further exploration.     
In his article, “Towards a Pure Ontology: Children’s Bodies and Morality”, Johan  
Dahlbeck (2014) uses Spinoza’s ontological paradigm to explore possible avenues for 
forms of Affective Pedagogy beyond institutional achievements. As Dahlbeck’s title 
suggests, the author attempts to rediscover a pedagogy grounded in the relation of bodies 
specific to the relations immediately involved rather than socially produced abstractions 
or what Deleuze terms as the “doctrine of judgment” (as cited in Dahlbeck, 2014).  
Dahlbeck (2014) refers to this ontological shift as a transition towards “the immanent 
powers of the body rather than the external relations that supposedly define it” (p.9).  
Using the Deleuzian/Spinozaistic form of affect, Dahlbeck (2014) cites Watkins (2006) 
and defines Affective Pedagogy “as the idea that generating (and being sensitive to) 
bodily affects-understood in terms of force and capacity rather than emotion or feeling”  
(p.20). Dahlbeck (2014) draws on Watkin’s Deleuzian/Spinozaistic conceptualizing of 
affect, but rather than attempt to plug it into the psychological apparatus of its institutions 
as Watkins (2006) does, refers to Sam Sellers’ (2009) assertion that pedagogy must be 
based in ethics rather than technical or methodological assertions resulting in a more 
ontologically inclined enquiry. Sam Sellers (2009) presents pedagogy as “an inherently 
34 
 
relational, emergent, and non-linear process that is unpredictable and therefore 
unknowable in advance” (p. 351). By using this form of pedagogy, Dahlbeck (2014) 
avoids “academic success” as the goal of Affective Pedagogy and instead frames it as 
follows:   
Affective learning pertains to the idea that generating (and being sensitive to) 
bodily affects- understood in terms of force and capacity rather than emotion or 
feeling (Watkins, 2006,pp.270,273) – can be thought of as the very hotbed of 
learning, where learning is understood as a creative process of experimentation 
with an exploration of one’s bodily capabilities- of exploring the as of yet 
unknown- rather than as a purely reflective process of developing one’s supposed 
natural ability to recognize and identify that which is already known. (p.20)  
Sellers’ (2009) conceptualizing of pedagogy is important for the context of 
Affective Pedagogy (Dahlbeck 2014). In his article “The Responsible Uncertainty of 
Pedagogy,” Sellers (2009) raises the challenging question that “perhaps pedagogy cannot 
readily be described because it is inherently relational?” (p.350). In his attempt at 
wrestling with pedagogy as a fluctuating relational event between bodies, Sellers (2009) 
chooses to define pedagogy as a process that “is thereby framed as a fundamentally 
relational process, which has ontological primacy over the knowledge and identities it 
produces” (p.351). This correlates well with the Deleuzian/Spinozaistic affect because it 
eliminates any top down ontological presumptions, because if pedagogy truly is “an 
inherently relational, emergent, and non-linear process that is unpredictable and therefore 
unknowable in advance” (Sellers, p.351), then there is a constant opening for generative 
and context specific forms of relations among bodies, a process that results in what  
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Dahlbeck (2014) describes as being “able to create something new and becoming 
something different body and mind” (p.22).  
Critical Pedagogy   
Having carved out a definition of Affective Pedagogy that relies on ontology and 
ethics within the context of relations of bodies, it is important to explore the current 
ontological paradigm that constitutes not only much of educational theory but also 
schools as institutions. Examining how educational institutions function within a political 
context is vital for determining avenues of opportunity for a truly Affective Pedagogy. 
The field of critical pedagogy (Giroux, 2007; Mclaren, 2007; Kincheloe, 2002; Freire, 
1970) provides the most useful tools for understanding what presumptions are behind the 
physical and mental spaces that confine and construct schools in the contemporary 
political context. Henry Giroux (2009) refers to this ontology as a “functionalist paradigm 
based on assumptions drawn from a positivist rationality” (p.49) in which schools are 
used as solely for the purpose of reproducing inequalities and unequal structures of 
capitalist society. Critical Pedagogy comes out of the spirit of Freire’s (1970) 
groundbreaking work, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, in which Freire describes the system 
of this  
“functionalist paradigm” in ontological terms.   
Freire (2005) argues that school functionalism stems from within the education 
system itself, in that within educators and their relations to students is the resulting 
deluded consciousness of the very pedagogy they constantly reaffirm within the 
classroom. According to Freire (2005), educators themselves are subjected to oppressive 
conditions and have had them internalized through the very system of education they 
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perpetuate, and thus are truly unaware of their own disillusionment and its consequences. 
Freire (2005) makes it clear that educators are part of the problem and emphasizes the 
authenticity of the educator in relation to the students when describing a truly liberating 
pedagogy. What Giroux refers to as the “functionalist paradigm” based on false 
assumptions, Freire (2005) refers to as “a mechanistic, static, naturalistic, spatialized 
view of consciousness” (p.77). Within this institutional apparatus lie the presumptions of 
the status quo, which enable the education system to function through a “banking system” 
(p.76) of education used to perpetuate inequalities through the reaffirmation of dominant 
presumptions. Freire (2005) claims that within this functionalist paradigm the power 
structure of society is portrayed as objective and unchangeable; thus students and  
teachers are left both equally alienated from their own subjective engagement within their 
own socio-political context and its “limit-situations” (p.99). One could assume that there 
is no openness for an Affective Pedagogy within an education based on this “functionalist 
paradigm,” in which knowledge is static and teacher-student relations remain dormant 
and hierarchical; however, work by Tony Negri and Micheal Hardt (2001, 2005, 2009) 
proposes that this issue is much more complicated than what the outright dismissal of 
schools as ontological wastelands implies.    
Affective Pedagogy as “The Commons”  
 It appears that Affective Pedagogy is within a political context that must be 
acknowledged and may even be completely undermining of the project at hand. How is it 
exactly that affect functions within this “functionalist paradigm” of post-industrial 
capitalist society? Regardless of how “functionalist” and “oppressive” forms of education 
may be, Spinoza’s ontology is immanent, not conditional, meaning that as long as there 
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are bodies in relation to one another there is affect as force and capacity. For answers to 
this complex question one must look to the works of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, 
who take up Spinoza’s ontology and proclaim that: “The problem that Spinoza poses is 
whether at the heart of modernity, there exists the hypothesis of government by the 
multitude, whether the institutionalization of the common is possible” (p.17).  Negri 
looks to break institutions from the “functionalist paradigm” that Freire and 
contemporary critical pedagogues now view as the dominant form of educational 
institutions, but also acknowledges that affect is a necessary component of these very 
institutions. It is because of this immanent requirement that Negri (2011) sees Spinoza’s 
ontological paradigm as a way out from the apparatus of capitalist functionalism that 
Freire describes. According to Hardt and Negri (2009), “every social institution rests on 
the common and is defined, in fact by the common it draws on, marshals, and creates” 
(p.158). More specifically, Hardt and Negri (2009) claim that all institutions are homes to 
acts of resistance that are constituted by affective relationships, which in turn are 
appropriated in the name of capitalist functionalism, ultimately transforming these 
resistant acts and the functionalist apparatus itself in which these immanent acts of 
resistance are appropriated.     
  What Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004, 2009) provide is a paradigm in which the 
generative ontology of Spinoza, the spirit of which has generated Affective Pedagogy, or 
what Hardt and Negri (2009) consider “the common,” finds itself within the dialectic of 
the capitalist apparatus of the “functionalist paradigm” that is exposed within the 
discourse of critical pedagogy. What remains to be explored is how exactly 
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studentteacher relationships function within this point of tension and whether educational 
institutions can become institutions of the “common” based on affective relationships or  
how exactly appropriation and oppression take form.     
According to Ruddick (2010), Hardt and Negri over-emphasize affective labour 
and its new role in immaterial labour. Ruddick (2010) claims are targeted because she 
feels Hardt and Negri’s position implies that affect was never a significant part of labour 
before, an argument which goes directly against the immanence of affect according to 
Ruddick (2010), in that to say affective labour exists now is to say that labour practices 
prior to it were not in fact acts constituted by affect as immanent duration. However it is 
worth noting that what Hardt and Negri (2000) mean by affective labour is not the 
inclusion of affect, but rather the centering of it within the paradigm of the 
biopolitical/biopower means of immaterial production. This new centering affect within 
the paradigm of capitalist production is important because it establishes networks and 
technologies that are meant to both build generative forms of affect while also controlling 
and appropriating them. Thus reclaiming these networks of production would not just be 
the reclaiming of traditional “means of production” but also the tools of communication 
for our most basic human interactions. This is the dual nature of Hardt and Negri’s 
political works, on one side the means of our most basic interactions as people are being 
appropriated (communication, subjectivity, affect) but are also building the networks 
necessary for new forms of subjectivities and affective relationships outside of the rigid 
representation of transcendent ontology discussed previously. This ever increasing 
commodification of our most ontological practices risks burning out the very forms of life 
that are required for this appropriation to take place.  
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Exploring the potential of creating truly affective relationships among teachers 
and students involves exploring the fundamental presumptions that construct educational 
institutions themselves. At the heart of Spinoza is a generative ontology, a challenge to 
the fundamental claim of modern sovereignty. Was Hobbes right? Is a top down approach 
to human relations a fundamental requirement for any civilized society? Spinoza says no, 
there is no person who craves relentless solitude; we are mutual benefactors of our own 
liberations amongst ourselves and each other on equal terms as bodies. I hope to build on 
what Freire (1970) and more recently, Giroux (2013), have deemed the “functionalist 
paradigm” of capitalist education, not to reaffirm it as an ontology, but reframe it as an 
apparatus more aligned within the context of Spinoza/Deleuze/Negri lineage in a quest 
for building institutions based on affect. Recently scholars such as Watkins (2006), 
Dahlbeck (2014), Semetsky (2004) and others have engaged with Spinoza’s Affect within 
educational contexts but without using the critical tools to acknowledge the larger 
political context of post-industrial capitalism. This project is thus an exploration of 
ontological possibilities within the student-teacher relationships, and how affect functions 
as an avenue for generating meaningful relationships within the context of educational 
institutions.   
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CHAPTER TWO  
Methodology  
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Autoethnography  
To explore Spinoza’s affect and generative ontology within student-teacher 
relations I hope to reflect on my past experiences as a student, student-teacher, and 
teacher. Using the method of autoethnography, I will explore my experiences and my 
struggles through multiple educational institutions across different institutional roles in 
order to explore affective relationships on the ontological level that Spinoza’s work 
requires. In their chapter “Autoethnography, Personal Narrative, Reflexivity,” Ellis and 
Bochner (2000) describe autoethnograpy as:    
an autobiographical genre of writing and research that displays the multiple layers 
of consciousness, connecting the personal to the cultural. Back and forth 
autoethnographers gaze, first through an ethnographic wide-angle lens, focusing 
outward on social and cultural aspects of their personal experience; then they look 
inward exposing a vulnerable self that is moved by and may move through, 
refract, and resist cultural interpretations. (p.744)  
Ellis and Bochner (2000) reveal how the methodology of autoethnography is 
positioned within the transition of social science from modern to post-modern discourse. 
The methodology of autoethnography undermines many assumptions of the modernist 
social science discipline, the likes of which were heavily critiqued in the discourses of 
post-structualism, deconstruction and feminism, as well as other modes of thought that 
constitute the post-modern period. The division of researcher and subject, “the reader as 
passive receiver of knowledge,” and “scientific illusion of control and mastery” are all 
presumptions challenged by autoethnograpy (Ellis and Bochner, 2000, p.746).    
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Autoethnography in this vein provides ample opportunity to remain relevant to the 
theoretical exploration of affect within the context of a Spinozist ontology. For example,  
Negri (2011) claims that when researching within the domain of Spinoza’s ontology, 
researchers must be “in an ontological context from the outset, in the experiential and 
hopeful continuity of a constitutive perspective” (p.92). According to Negri (2013), 
definitions such as conatus and affect cannot rely on static definitions or else they risk 
falling back into the domain of modern sovereignty:  
A static definition of conatus would be a more Hobbesian definition of conatus- 
the goal toward which all modern individualism is trying to steer us. It would 
necessarily be a paving of the way for a dialectical shift to another, normative 
level somewhere above and beyond society – a dialectical shift to power and the 
State. This Spinoza excludes. Indeed, he not only excludes it; it strikes him as 
repugnant, because this is the same process that leads to superstition. (p.87)  
 According to this quote, if affect or conatus are to remain true to Spinoza’s generative 
ontology, one must avoid categorizing them within traditional institutional discourses.  
Returning to Deleuze’s (1988) claim that one must use the process of “affective reading” 
in order to come away with Spinoza’s ontological repositioning, autoethnography as 
presented by Ellis and Bouchner (2000) proves to be a useful methodology that can be 
used to communicate within the domain of “affective reading”; as Ellis and Bochner 
(2000) propose, autoethnography is a methodology in which “you let yourself be 
vulnerable, then your readers are more likely to respond vulnerably, and that’s what you 
want, vulnerable readers.” (p.752). Within the context of critical pedagogy, 
autoethnography could be conceived as a process that reengages my subjectivity with 
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what Freire (2005) terms “limit-situations” that lead to the overcoming of “generative 
themes”, a process that is a fundamental constituent of “Conscientizacao”, which allows 
people to recognize “limit-situations” as barriers to be broken through “limit-acts” 
causing movements towards liberation (pp.97-100).  
            Writing   
             In alignment with Deleuze’s “Affective Reading,” writing an autoethnography is 
not about encapsulating or representing experiences as static events but rather an 
evocation of experience followed by reflexivity (Richarson, 2001; Muncey, 2010). 
Muncey (2010) elaborates on how this reflexive process crosses institutional lines:  
It is our capacity for reflexivity, the awareness of being aware, that allows us to 
represent and re-present the products of our imaginations in a variety of ways. I 
would even go so far as to say we have a destiny to be creative. Unfortunately, we 
have a tendency to label our creative endeavors as hobbies or struggle to keep the 
serious world of work/research in an objective style. (p.55)  
           Writing will be used in correlation with what Muncey (2010) refers to as  
“artefacts” or what Ellis and Bochner (2000) describe as “objects of reflection” from my 
past experiences as a student, student-teacher, and finally as an Ontario Certified 
Teacher. The artefacts chosen will range from personal journal entries, assessed 
assignments, report card comments or anything I deem to be of significant evocation 
from my experience in education. These artefacts will be used to generate affective 
responses from myself in a journal, followed by an analysis using the theoretical tools 
from the ontological framework outlined in this proposal.  
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                 Artefacts   
                  Evocation rather than representation is the key to producing an 
autoethnography that explores “affective reading” in expressive terms. The goal of using 
evocation is to take an artefact that evokes or affects me enough to produce or articulate 
these affects within a journal entry. These artefacts are items that have been produced or 
forged within the relations that constitute them at the time of their creation. Thus there 
will be two products that will make up the artefact: the document that is chosen and my 
affective response to it written in a journal. These will be used as sites of affect from 
which I can draw conceptual grounds. The goal will be to infer how these artefacts 
signify the point of intersection while unraveling the relationships and events constituting 
the artefact. Bouchner and Ellis (2000) refer to this as reflexivity, which will be followed 
my theoretical attempts to configure my artefacts/reflexivity within the larger ontological 
paradigm provided by Spinoza/Deleuze as well as the political context of critical 
pedagogy.  
            My experiences with affective engagement within schools across institutional 
roles of subordination and authority are at the center of this research. To access these I 
will go through artefacts from as early as kindergarten across to my final years and into 
teacher’s college. I will select artefacts depending on how strong of an evocation I feel 
they present and follow this through reflexive writing. The artefacts chosen will be 
analysed chronologically but will most likely cross reference each other in terms of 
theoretical analysis.  
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Ontology and Affect  
One of the challenges of researching affect is that traditional methods of research 
relay heavily on attempting to conceptualize life and its expressions through static 
definitions and quantitative methods (Massumi, 2002). According to Massumi (2002), 
this is the reason why affect poses so many challenges to researchers in traditional 
disciplines and through traditional methodologies that rely on ontological assumptions 
about individuals, time and lack (to name the few discussed earlier). This research project 
will engage with affect not by categorizing or tracing what is but rather mapping out what 
it is affect can do, as Seigworth and Gibbs (2010) outline. Kincheloe and McLaren (2005) 
give a good description of the importance of the research to object relationship within an 
appropriate ontological paradigm:   
Process-sensitive scholars watch the world flow by like a river in which the exact 
contents of the water are never the same. Because all observers view an object of 
inquiry from their own vantage points in the web or reality, no portrait of a social 
phenomenon is ever exactly the same as another. Because all physical, social, 
cultural, psychological, and educational dynamics are connected in a larger fabric, 
researchers will produce different descriptions of an object of inquiry depending 
on what part of the fabric they have focused on – what part of the river they have 
seen. The more unaware observers are of this type of complexity, the more 
reductionist the knowledge they produce about it. (p.319)  
The descriptions of affect that this project is to exhibit, first through evocative 
writing then tied back into theory, will be a mapping of how affect has produced itself 
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subjectively and immanently in my past student- teacher relationships. This analysis 
however, will not act as a summative analytic enclosure so to speak, but as an extension 
of the artefacts and how it is they affect me. In his essay “Lives of Infamous Men”  
(1977), Foucault meditates over the use of artefacts in his earlier work, work in which he 
attempted to “restore their intensity in an analysis” (p.279). Foucault’s dedication to 
realising the intensity of the artefacts and the marginalized voices they contained, in an 
exposition of the discursive power that embodies them was a purely analytic work, and 
according to Foucault, it was in a sense, a failure because “the primary intensities which 
had motivated me remained outside. And since there was a risk that they might not pass 
into the order of reasons, since my discourse was incapable of bearing them as would be 
proper, wasn’t it best to leave them in the same form which had made me experience 
them?” (p.280). Foucault thus understood that there was an intensity produced by these 
artefacts that could not be fully captured in an analysis, even in his own most elegant 
prose. This is not to dismiss analysis as futile but understand its limitations when trying 
to embody the intensities or affects that produce the artefacts and vice versa.    
Gatens (1996) describes the story of “Friday” in contrast with “Robinson Crusoe” 
and the engagements of bodies that each story exhibits. In Robinson Crusoe, the man 
stranded on an island rebuilds his environment as a reflection of European capitalist 
society, a display of what Gatens (1996) refers to as “homo economicus” (p.171). This 
implies that Robinson Crusoe is basically attempting to reaffirm ontological assumptions 
as ingrained within nature. It is making the claim that Robinson possess an inner 
essentialized subject that is expressed outwards to condition the material bodies in his 
relation. This plays into what transcendent ontology attempts to ingrain, an abstract order 
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to be forced on the immanent plane. This is in juxtaposition to Friday, which is the same 
story told but in the other ontological direction, in which Robinson’s identity unravels 
within a new context of material bodies, a process in which “Robinson becomes 
elemental…the gradual unfolding and undoing of all his habituated affects” (p.172). Thus 
in a new context of bodies Robinson’s “self” is revealed to be a habit of action rather than 
an ingrained ontological being. The difference in these stories, as outlined by Gatens 
(1996), is of value to this autoethnography because it maps out the important risk that I 
need to avoid, that being the potential of making past experiences into “a simulacrum of 
the familiar” (p.172), of attempting to reaffirm habits as transcendence. Gatens (1996) 
makes clear the ontological direction required for mapping out affect and its potential:  
Robinson’s metamorphosis (in Friday), his becoming molecular, need not be 
understood as a model or ideal to which anyone should aspire. Rather, it is an 
attempt to map the capacities and the possibilities of a body that has been 
removed from its usual contexts – what can this body do once its habitual 
frameworks and structures are lost? With what may it combine? What are its 
limits? (p.174)  
What Gatens (1996) explicates here is that any immanent research approach to areas of 
ontology, should not attempt to set itself up as an “ideal” but instead focus on capacity. 
What do these artefacts evoke and how is it that affect functions within certain capacities 
now or when they were conceived? Returning to Foucault’s “Lives of Infamous Men”  
(1977), an introduction to a collection of early-18th-century records of internment, 
Foucault spoke to how he chose to lay out his artefacts, which he referred to as a distribution 
in which “the sake of the intensity” of the selected artefacts best appeared to him, a choice 
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that attempts to “preserve…the effect of each” of the artefacts selected (p.280). This is how 
this project will be constructed, a laying out of artefacts based on intensity of affect, an 
evocative expression for each, and an analysis that explores their functions and capacities.       
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CHAPTER THREE  
Artefacts/Evocative Writing  
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Figure 1: Artefact 1a  
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Artefact 1b  
Do I remember anything from when I was 4? I have vague recollections of 
images, mostly the classrooms and the toys I liked. I remember there was a bathtub with 
pillows in it where I confessed my love for a girl. I gave her a card and had spelt her 
name wrong. No I actually couldn’t spell at all so I just picked a name at random from the 
front board hoping it was hers…and it wasn’t. But that is the same as spelling it wrong I 
guess, rather than a subtle grammatical discrepancy it was a full out sematic debauchery. 
Got to get her name right. I panicked and told her it was for someone else then made my 
escape and never spoke to her again, or maybe I did, but I defiantly felt at that moment 
that I wasn’t at least that’s the image of it.   
There was tile floor with the odd carpet here and there. Lots of toys, building 
blocks, two computers – my favorite game was about bookworms in helicopters. We 
played soccer outside often until the ball was kicked over the fence and into the dense 
low hanging trees, so we would ride bikes, little tricycles around large brick columns.   
It seems odd to start here. I can’t remember any of my kindergarten teachers, not 
their names or faces or voices. I only remember the setting and particular moments of 
distress and affection. A friend could burp the ABC’s and I thought it was magic. One 
time he went too far and barfed on the table and I can remember the sour smell.   
But why start here? I don’t even know who the teacher was or who I was? What 
impression does this artefact express in me? Other than a few memories that kind of hang 
in my chest. I think about images, images of sounds, images of eyes of other students.  
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Images of the bathtub “that’s not my name” and the magical “A-B-C’s” and so on in 
sequence of flashes.   
One thing is clear about this artefact, which is that it is all language. I can feel the 
theoretical impulses when I look at this artefact.  
 I guess this is a young me, dumping sand on my head, laying on tables, and being 
a nuisance. I really feel the need to throw this to the feminist wolves and let them feast on 
the gendered text, the meat of which is the equipping of a little boy, a little prince of 
patriarchy. But I’m just playing around here.   
It seems to me at this moment, that an important distinction worth making is that I 
have no idea who this kid is: “Lukas”. I can’t possibly remember what my state of mind 
was on that or any other day in ol’ 94. I can’t remember the teacher or whether I cared for 
him/her or if I cared for much of anything at all. Only the vague images with sounds (the 
idea of sounds?).   
Here in this artefact there is only language. I have a code, a set of symbols and 
signs that construct an image of my little boy-self. A disruptive yet lovable child, a 
boychild, one to be conditioned and socialized, a calculation. What is the answer to this 
image-boy’s restless movement, what is the question? Dumping sand on his head and 
expecting laughter, timeouts, bad speech, all of which is a series of behaviour that is a 
“concern” regardless of being a ”terrific” kid.         
Boxes within boxes. Letters to words to sentences to categories to “Lukas”.  
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Whoever that is. This encompasses the relationship between the teacher and I. My 
actions, movements, forces are all embodied into language. A “very excited” “terrific 
kid” who needs “reminders to calm” and has an odd habit of “hiding”.   
The little rebel boy Lukas.   
Hiding and dumping sand on his head? Who is this kid? He’s “testing” and being 
a “challenge”. Testing what? Challenging what? Authority? It feels like Lukas is really 
far away in my memory, but also far away in the artefact itself. It feels to me like a 
distant impression or trace, a construction of a kid named “Lukas” that this language  
imprints on me.   
My mind is darkness, and then I read the words, their meanings and their sounds 
which light up the darkness and off in the cusps of the grey, where the light falls away 
and the darkness begins, there is a silhouette of a boy named “Lukas” whom I don’t 
know. He’s running around just beyond the light of the words ranting incoherent babbles 
while throwing sand and laughing in cackled squawks.   
And there’s a voice both my own sitting here writing this, and also brimming 
from the artefact itself that speaks:   
Come into the light Lukas and let’s see who you are little boy. What a challenge this one 
is running in and out of the light, hiding and babbling and always too excited. A force, a 
challenge, a test. Let the light of language see you so you can wrap it around you and 
breathe it in. Leave this silliness behind Lukas, little boy Lukas, and let’s see you and 
who becomes you. Stop hiding and babbling and come into the circle and express 
yourself with good clean speech so that I can understand you and you can become the 
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terrific kid without the challenges. Wouldn’t that be nice? To be calm and coherent in the 
light of language. We just want to see you and be with you it’s so cold out there where 
you’re hiding and babbling. Here little boy Lukas time to come in now.        
There is no obstinate authority figure here. There is a living breathing 
nonanthropomorphic creature that shifts from here to there. It does not pounce but 
beckons and enchants. It has no body but bodies. It is a dull throb rather than a sting. To 
say it’s here means it has become there and vice versa. It vibrates in waves that disperse, 
collect and return. You need to be a gifted little dancer to maneuver, to step over and 
slide away from its embrace – you must remain dispersed. A shifty little flash you are 
Lukas, but the babbling and the hiding is not enough and you can’t burry yourself in sand, 
these things get you nowhere because there is nowhere to go. Here comes the tide to pull 
you in to the man in the lighthouse so stop the splashing and laughing because it’s time to 
come in.   
Here’s a romantic image:  
Under the stars the children play in the ocean and the 
water is black with shimmering white reflections and the 
waves break loudly and the kids laugh chantingly until the 
waves crash on the shore with the children in tow, either 
on the smooth white sand or on the dull grey stones.  
Figure 2: Artefact 2a  
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Artefact 2b  
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I am going to set this specific memory up as best I can. All I have for memories 
are flashes of images. One image of my teacher in front of the class and then another 
image of her crying quietly to me in the hallway. These are the dominant images and then 
in flood the memories of grade 2 in sharp sequences of flashes. Sitting in my desk 
painfully writing out letters over and over, making jokes during circle time, in-class 
recess during rainy days, girl who sat next to me short and blonde, ‘goosebumps’, 
punching a kid in the nose and crying from guilt and more and more odd memories here 
and there. I know this Lukas better than the babbling Lukas, I know this teacher much 
better than the one in kindergarten. I can see my teacher and I care about her. But back to 
the distinct memory that this artefact produces.    
I sat in my desk and listened closely to the teacher, who was standing at the front 
of the room, who I’ll call Mrs. Smith. She was reviewing criteria for our personal 
journals, these journals consisted of answers to questions given by Mrs. Smith. She was 
carefully outlining the expectations she felt were required of grade 2 students for writing 
in their journals. Mrs. Smith had a serious demeanor, she only really smiled once in a 
while, but she was warm and had a confident strength about her, like she’d been around 
the block a few times and seen some shit. All and all however, an approachable woman 
from what I can recall. She was middle-aged, short hair, thick-rimmed glasses, and had 
excellent posture.   
She’s going through the criteria of journal entries and comes to a specific point:  
that some of us are not writing enough in our journals and an appropriate amount of 
writing is a necessary requirement.   
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I’m day dreaming at this point, I don’t really care, I’m looking at the books in the 
back of the room, I’m looking out the window at the sky and the skinny tree that’s 
wrapped in some kind of metal support system. It’s a curious thing how fast the clouds 
are going by and they need my attention. I think she sees this. I think, maybe not then but 
now reflecting on it, I think she noticed my drifting, my meandering at the clouds and the 
metal-wrapped tree.   
At this point she says my name LUKAS within a sentence, not sure what the 
sentence is (I piece it together later) but I know she said my name so I turn my attention 
to her and she’s holding my journal open to the class, I’m confused and exposed. She 
points to my response in the journal, the one in the artefact, and says, “this is an example 
of what not to do, I need to know more than just ‘I played on the computer’, what did you 
play? With who? And why?.” I don’t think anyone laughed, but I still only held it 
together for about two seconds. I put my head down on the desk and began to cry. I 
figured I’d just do it quietly so not to disturb anyone. I just felt bad about myself and my 
stupid mistake so I cried. There was a pause when other students stopped looking at Mrs. 
Smith and turned their heads towards me to her left off in the corner. Just a stale awkward 
moment.   
This all happened very fast, I feel like she saw my head go down out of the corner 
of her eye and was moving towards me before it fully dropped. It seemed that as soon as 
my forehead touched my forearm I was being dragged out of the room by my hand. I just 
remember dead silence and I had stopped crying and was in shock, not sure what I was 
suppose to feel just in a state of total misunderstanding.   
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We stood in the hallway and I could not see her face because she was standing 
very close and looking up at the ceiling. She was very close. I could smell her. She 
squatted down onto her knees and looked me in the face, demanded my attention, and I 
could see she was crying very subtly, her eyes didn’t go all red like mine and she did not 
seem to have any overflow of mucus and fluids like me. When I cried it felt like my 
whole body cried and the evidence was everywhere, hers on the other hand was so subtle, 
I remember thinking that that must be how adults cry, subtly and in control.   
I still can’t remember what she said to me. I wasn’t listening to her words because 
the sight of her tears frightened me so much that I lost all cognitive capacity for words. It 
was a sympathetic and apologetic tone though, I could sense that, but that might have 
only been from the sight of her face and the pitch of her voice.   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Figure 3: Artefact 3a  
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Artefact 3b  
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Grade 5. I passed that year with the acclaimed “academic” award. Basically an 
award they gave to students who maintained an A average. At the end of the year, all of 
the academic kids got to go to the final year assembly and stand at the front of the school 
to accept the award. Did I think I was smart? Yes and No. Grade 5 was the only year I 
received the academic award. That was also the year that one of my closest friends failed.  
For whatever reason, he had a separate trajectory that year in terms of academic success. 
We hung around each other every day that year and somehow he failed and I got the 
academic award.    
He had neat printing but would only write a sentence or two for whole 
assignments. His art was always small too, and he never used colours just different shades 
of grey with his pencil. The teacher thought he was dumb, parents thought he was dumb, 
students thought he was dumb, he used passive and present tense erratically and double 
negatives often, he thought he was stupid, he was convinced.   
This is a working class community, and throughout school my friend “Sam” 
suffered from working class stupid. He knew it was bullshit, getting bad grades doesn’t 
mean you’re stupid, there’s this general understanding that life is just a big game and that 
its rigged, and the only thing worth valuing is whatever forms of gratification are most 
readily available and how well you are able to reap them, and based on your ability to 
hustle for these things, whether they be girls or drugs or money, determines your worth, 
your real value.   
For Sam saying he was stupid gave him a pass on all the anxiety and tedious mind 
games of ‘playing the game’ inside the classroom, he was real working class, I was 
second generation working class, the way his parents talked at home and the topics 
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discussed was a whole different world than the classroom. The things valued in the class, 
the things that got you the grades weren’t just foreign to Sam but down right fucking 
degrading. Draw a fucking picture of a sunset using different shades of pastels? Fuck that 
just use some pencil shading then hand it in early and bail. Sam’s only goal ever, was 
freedom, freedom to think and create and play on his own terms, and within that domain 
he was brilliant funny and all kinds of colours. He’d hand in everything early with 
minimal effort and then made fart sounds and threw erasers at people until we died 
laughing. At the end my hands were covered in pastels and my sunset looked like shit but  
I got the grade and Sam didn’t because it was just another stupid fucking assignment with 
zero fucking relevance.   
Sam’s dad worked nights and drank a lot. He was like a hibernating bear in his 
room. I never saw him that much even when I slept over or hung out there for extended 
periods of time. Sam would poke his head into his dad’s room and ask for change to get 
chips or rent video games. Sam had this old shitty basement where we would play 
videogames and watch Southpark. Sam had this freedom that I never did, this kind of 
distance from his parents that gave him his own space, but it wasn’t all good. It was only 
good from my perspective because it allowed us to take risks and create things. He came 
over to my house once and we had hamburger helper and Sam said it was awesome to 
have a “home cooked meal”.  
Sam was a hero that year. He didn’t just fail, he failed spectacularly. I just went 
the other direction I guess. Thinking about Sam and all the time we spent together I have 
to say I’m actually pretty ashamed of this award. I think I’ll burn it after this. I mean 
really, fuck you and this fucking award and fuck the box where you put the “good kids”. 
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Sam was beautifully creative and kind and savagely witty and every fucking year he got 
dumped on and buried by discerning gestures of “why doesn’t this kid just listen? Why 
doesn’t he just do the work?”. Teachers and parents called him lazy, how the fuck is a kid 
with ADHD lazy? Shouldn’t he be hyperactive?   
We built a wrestling ring in his backyard one summer, Sam designed it and rallied 
us to build it. It had an entrance and an on-ramp and everything. Sam got his whole 
neighbourhood to come out and watch and participate in wrestling events. We created our 
own characters and costumes and finisher moves. We created whole story lines and had 
our own violent theater with thrash metal on a boom box for an orchestra. We pitched 
tents in the backyard so we could sleep, swim and create without disruption from parents. 
Sam gave me that and it was only possible because he was given the space to do it, that 
space which also made it impossible for him to draw fucking sunsets with pastels. And 
here I am, after everything, with my hands covered in pastels flaunting an academic 
award like it means shit.  
I’m angry about this and guilty. But I’m also hesitant about it. In comes the 
images of the faces of people who love me and pushed this “play the game’ mentality. 
These are not the faces of cold-hearted calculation, Sam was not consciously disposed of 
or despised in anyway. I know it’s not all evil. My grade 5 teacher was not a bad person.  
In fact I have good feelings about her now and I did then too. She worked hard and 
sincerely cared about us. I know now as someone who has taught grade 5 that she cared 
for Sam too, I know she grew frustrated when he produced minimal work, when he 
avoided her looks, when he continuously shut her out of his world no matter her attempts 
to reach him. But I also know she went through a lot to fail him, in terms of getting the 
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right documents and permissions to do so, she really felt he needed to fail. He really 
hated her for it too, slowly she became an abstract symbol to him, a symbol of authority, 
and shame, and guilt, and pain. He produced just enough work to keep her at bay so he 
could sneak back into the crowd of other students to avoid her, numbing himself from the 
whole situation. And here’s me with my academic award. It feels like I wear this little 
academic badge every day sewed into my flesh, like a little badge of horror. Sam for all 
his failures, was at least a disruption, a stutter in the system, his residue still lingers there 
in chunks of eclectic colours, while mine was just a spurt of smooth grey streaks, like a 
slug.  
Figure 4: Artefact 4a  
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Artefact 4b  
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I miss teaching kids. I miss creating lessons that kids enjoy and even the ones they 
don’t. I had some good lessons and some not so good ones. Some were just too abstract, 
too idea driven, too synthetic, I was manipulating the students rather than kindling them.   
I feel like I’ve been over this lesson template a thousand times over and over in 
my head. It means very little to me now. At one point I would have enjoyed holding it up 
on a podium to examine and reveal the deep seeded epistemological assumptions 
embedded within these words and within these boxes. During my days as a teacher and as 
a volunteer these lesson plans were my main target in terms of pointing towards any form 
of oppressive apparatus. The only way to describe forcing classroom experiences into 
these templates and into its language is – SUFFOCATING. But that’s all I want to say 
about it. So much energy and potential have been put into these things from producing 
them within their given criteria, to laying in bed in the middle of the night brooding over 
how much I despise them. This was my relationship to this thing, despising it, thus 
reacting to it, now I want to think about it objectively, from the cold distance it deserves,  
I’m going to kill it, slap it on a cold steal table and then cut it open and reveal its 
functions, its responsive nervous system and its tangled masses of flesh.    
It’s like the relationships between the students and I combine into a complicated 
web, and in the middle of this web is a giant boulder weighing everything down, it does 
not tear any holes but only specific fibers – only the most delicate ones break. There is 
only one variable the boulder cares about and that’s strength, what fibres can hold it, keep 
it from falling. It breaks and weighs down everything it touches.  When the classroom is 
in high intensity and affect is brimming, the web of relations starts shifting and rising but 
always with the boulder sitting and weighing us down keeping us within the box. There is 
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no lid to this box because that would be too absolute and rigid, with the lid closed the box 
would heat up and explode, so it’s better to leave the roof open so the heat doesn’t get too 
much and in the meantime just toss a rock in there to disrupt and way it down keep things 
in the box. But this is only one dimension of the lesson template’s character that has 
multiple angles and multiple functions. It’s the most obvious and explicit function and it’s 
the one I have loathed and anguished over the most, but it’s just a distraction from its 
more primary or efficient forms of technicality. The boulder is only what “is” – a dead 
weight used to condition and restrain relationships.   
But in terms of how it functions, how it moves, in this dimension the lesson 
template is a hijacker. No face or human expressions, just letter and word parts of images 
and structure. It is a tiny little machine. Humbly crafted; it’s parts and systems work 
efficiently and effectively and it is extremely user friendly, an easy to use tool that limits 
and categorizes things outside of its yoke bringing as much as possible into its orbit. It 
has to be malleable enough to be implemented ubiquitously by multiple users. It has no 
central hub but is instead a disbursement of tiny little parts that produce and capture 
subjectivities and affects. This is not abstract or metaphysical rhetoric. This is how the 
lesson template feels to me this is really how it works it’s a dirty little secret. It feels to 
me like a concrete mechanical frame of words and boxes that condition and generate 
simultaneously, multi-dimensionality, ubiquitously and often in utter deafening silence, 
with only a few murmurs or whimpers from the occasional disheartened teacher or 
student. Administrators –acting as technicians – use these few cries of despair as signals 
of faults in its mechanics, which means the template must be retooled and reassembled 
for these new unique spaces in which they have seemed to disjoint and become 
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momentarily ineffective. As teachers, we carried these templates everywhere, in our 
lesson books, on our USBs, but most importantly, in our minds – in the parameters of 
images of what can be and what should be possible.        
More specifically, I came early and stayed late everyday. Taking work home with 
you is a bad idea, you need to be assessing and creating lesson plans everyday and by the 
time you get home you are exhausted. We all wrestled with the lesson template 
differently, I was always trying to out-maneuver it. Occasionally I managed to flee its 
orbit, but I’d always get sucked back into it. When I planned a really good lesson it would 
be in jotted down notes or images on the smart board or in the pages of a short story, 
these would be the generative signifiers of each lesson, they gave out ripples among the 
students who would respond by generating their own ripples and so on and so on. But I 
always knew in the back of my mind, that my assessment would be mostly based on my 
lesson book, which consisted of lesson templates for every lesson I taught, six lessons a 
day over a two month period and that these affective ripples were always subjective, 
creative, and gone forever. I knew then there was no way to really capture the pulse of a 
successful lesson in the static dead objects of the lesson template. These lesson templates 
thus had another side to them, that being the taxidermist, each lesson template is the death 
of the lesson that shaped it, and any lesson template that was put into use pre-emptively 
came out different every time. If I did not use a template to build a lesson it would only 
be a matter of time before I would be forced to do so. So it hung in the back of my head, 
the words and their boxes stealing moments and hijacking language, riding the ripples of 
affect until they disappeared and then claiming to have found them, to have categorised 
them, to have made them into a series of signifiers that could reproduce the exact affect in 
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which they were conceived, they had no fucking clue that every affect is different and 
fleeting and harmonious- no. fucking. clue.   
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Figure 5: Artefact 5a  
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Artefact 5b   
I first read Han’s book in 2011, he gave me a copy of it and said I could keep it. I 
had asked him rather bluntly “Can I take that?” Not “may I have that please” or “can I see 
that” or “is that your most excellent book?” – just a straight up obnoxious “can I take 
that??” It was during our first meeting, when I was just a random student who had 
emailed him out of nowhere asking questions and seeing if he’d talk to me.  
I showed up and was being an asshole. I was testing him to see what he could put 
up with and how he would respond. Nothing explicitly rude, just verbal jousting without 
any of the ‘proper’ etiquette that one would assume such a meeting would require. Just  
enough tone that it would put off a professor who took themselves too seriously.  
 His book was just sitting on his desk, and in the middle of him saying something  
I just interjected with “Can I take that?” and pointed at the book. He said sure and slid it 
over to me and returned to what it was he was saying. I listened intently, hung on every 
word, but made sure to look around and appear inattentive as if I could care less what he 
was saying. The tactic here was to really listen to what someone is saying while 
appearing not to, then when they’re done talking, you say something that clearly indicates 
you were listening, but soaked in a kind of inattentive whimsy, and if they get frustrated 
by it then they aren’t really listening to you and they don’t really care what it is you are 
saying. If they can’t push past gestures, past the lousy style to see the real content then 
they’re lazy dickheads so fuck em’. As far as I was concerned, my posturing and 
arrogance was superficial as long as I was listening to what it is they were actually 
saying. What does it really matter if I slouch or stare at the roof, I’m listening and 
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understanding what it is you’re saying, I’m sorry if it doesn’t take my whole physical 
being to grasp it.   
This kind of interaction, a sort of testing, was and was not a choice for me. For a 
long time it was a way for me to resist. At this point (fourth year of undergrad), university 
seemed to me to just be a long boring etiquette class where talking, walking and writing 
“professionally” was the most important thing an educator or learner could do. God it’s 
so absurd. If you’re from anywhere that doesn’t wholly align with the coveted values of 
middle class white people right down to their emphasis of passive obedient mannerisms, 
good fucking luck succeeding in an academic institution.   
And let me make this very clear: I was lucky enough to have a CHOICE as to 
whether or not to act this way. Whereas most working class kids or black kids or 
aboriginal kids or international kids or any kids who sucked at school in general, the 
youth of the underclass, most of these kids do NOT have a choice and instead have just 
known one predominant mode of interaction and are too real, too sincere, to switch back 
and forth like me. I’m a traitor to both sides. So for the most part I chose to act working 
class and unprofessional. And when I did, teachers and other students, usually old white 
people who were all jacked up on 80 year old behaviourism, would give me that look like  
“awe you’re just a little rough around the edges don’t worry I’ll teach you how to act” or  
“hmm you don’t really belong here do you? That’s okay we’ll make the best of it” -  
FUCK YOU! You’re a fucking alienated anxious lapdog who jumps through hoops for 
goldstars, and refuse to look passed even your most basic presumptions because either 
you’re an idiot or coward, so thanks but no thanks Pavlov.   
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But back to Hans. Once a week we met for an hour of conversation. After the first 
meeting my arrogant posturing began to slip away, I would bring paper and make notes, 
he would explicate points and I would think and try to put them in my own words and he 
would affirm or disaffirm certain things. We bounced around disciplines and experiences, 
all dialogue was open and always and only relevant to my concerns, to my context and 
understanding because that was where the value was. No external criteria other than my 
own immediate understanding.    
I remember painful moments of me sitting in that chair and gazing upwards 
rubbing my face trying to grasp at something Hans had just said and not knowing what to 
say, during these long pauses Hans would either say something or just sit there relaxed 
and stare at me until I found what it was I was saying. But the most important thing I 
learned, was that this whole way of carrying myself was indeed an act of resistance, but 
also a form of resistance that had its own limitations. In that there are moments when 
taking notes and eye contact and rephrasing points are not just forms of banking 
education. I learned I could take notes and struggle with ideas and ask questions 
attentively without feeling like I was being pimped by the system or like I was stabbing 
Sam in the back, that concepts and systems of thought could be immediately beneficial to 
my immediate context rather than as some technical bullshit to be memorized and stored 
in the hopes of it paying off down the road once I got some shit job to apply it in. 
Learning is best done within a complicated social context, not in a vacuum of 
professionalism to be made valuable in a later context that makes a bunch of assholes 
money. FUCK!   
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If I didn’t want to read something then I just wouldn’t read it and Hans 
understood. He wasn’t there to force some bullshit criteria on me and I wasn’t there to 
pretend to care about said criteria. I wanted to sincerely learn something, I wanted to be 
challenged, to have my most basic assumptions fucking shattered, they were already 
cracked and useless, just old crumbled monuments blocking my vision, my way out.  
I had first met Hans in a large first year course where I just sat in the crowd and 
listened. I never approached him. He spoke of Foucault and Marx and Deleuze and 
Spinoza as if they were old friends. And from that course on into fourth year I had not 
come into contact with any substantial theory so that’s why I emailed Hans. From first 
year to fourth year none of the conceptual frameworks or epistemologies that I learned 
from Hans in first year had been brought up in any meaningful way. I was cynical and 
desensitized and above all else – STARVED. When I said “Can I take that?” I meant  
“I’m fucking starving, please I’m fucking starving!”   
After our first meeting I went straight to the library. It was at night and I went to 
the 9th floor where I always worked. The 9th floor of the Brock Library has little windows 
next to some of the desks, and out of the windows there’s a good view of the campus and 
beyond it you can see the city of St. Catharines lumbering below the escarpment. So that 
night I sat down next to my favourite window and opened Hans’ book and I read the first 
paragraph.   
I looked at the pencil in my hand, and then out the window down at the lights 
shimmering behind the trees in streams and I thought “what did I get myself into?” This 
wasn’t like anything I had read before. And it was in that moment that I realized how 
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silent the empty library floor was and how far away the outside lights were, and it was a 
very lonely moment, one that people feel when they realize there is no going back, but 
back to where? Well wherever it was I had already tried it and it just didn’t work for me, 
so I started again – with the first sentence.  
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Figure 6: Artefact 6a  
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Artefact 6b  
St. Thomas is a town of lines. Perfectly placed geographically between Buffalo 
(203km), Detroit (195km), and Toronto (196km), it is/was a triangle of industry with 
specific historical points of rupture and growth.  
Defined as a town in 1852 with 1300 people, it consisted of predominantly 
farmers, until it became a center of commerce in 1856 when the first railway was put in to 
connect London (East) to Port Stanley (West) with St. Thomas sitting just in the middle. 
St. Thomas slowly began to become a trading center for local farmers and merchants 
from the larger county area. It was the first breathe of capital, the first motion of a 
particular form of growth. Freight and passengers, sellers and buyers, producers and 
consumers started to buzz and intermingle, with chatter and dusty coins and aromas of 
uncooked produce and steam. Bodies moving and stopping, resting and speeding.   
Following this initial railway came the Canadian Southern Railway and its 
headquarters in 1873. Followed by The Great Western Railway, The Wabash, The Grand 
Trunk, The Pere Marquette and the Pacific Railway. St. Thomas grew from 1300 people 
to 8000 people in 15 years. It was a particular kind of growth, a rupture of industry, a 
grand mechanical production. St. Thomas became known as the railway capital of 
Canada.   
Of course these all died in the mid 20th century, with the new technological shift 
in economic production, the railways became empty and the Factories moved in, it went 
from a railway town to a factory town. From the CSR to Ford, from conductors to line 
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managers, from steam to gas. All until Ford closed in 2011 along with many of the other 
factoires.   
The railroad stations sit empty, right in the center of the town between blocks of 
older homes and the downtown strip which consists mostly of fast food restaurants. Right 
in the heart of the sprawl sits this giant old red building with broken windows and its 
empty space surrounding it. Ford sits just outside of the southeast side, just before the 
country homes begin, where they found the cheapest piece of land, it sits and makes the 
space empty.    
Blossom close – Blossom close.  
What’s the next great mode of production? Where is its space? Where do all the 
working class people go now? Where is their space? There’s still some factory work, 
mostly precarious non-unionized shift work, but enough for a few to live. Global 
capitalism is fast, you need to be able to hire and lay off people on a dime.   
The town is a body and I never realised my part in it until I got to the end of high 
school and I had to look out there and see what was going on, how does this body 
function and what is my role going to be in it. This brought up questions. Why should I 
bother with university? I got bad to mediocre grades until the second semester of grade 
12, and then I went back for a semester and got the 6 required university credits to go to 
university, but why?    
What was the moment I decided? Well there was no real conscious will for me to 
do well in school or to go to university. Since my great year of the academic, I never 
really did well at school. There was no real definitive moment when getting good grades 
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became my goal. But I won’t say it came naturally either because that would imply I was 
trying to do poorly in school which wasn’t the case. I just was and whatever grades I got 
were the grades I got.   
In my head it reads like a basic narrative of educational studies: “The kid struggles 
with grades and then really applies himself near the end and poof!, it’s a wonderful story 
of educational achievement.”   
This synopsis would then be followed by some basic surface level inquiry:   
“He must have had some great teacher that inspired him or made him feel exceptional” – 
well yeah but not really. There were teachers that I felt I connected with but none of them 
inspired me to get good grades. Inspiration for me never lead to good grades, in fact quite 
the opposite.   
“He must have some dream he wanted to achieve and it inspired him to become a good 
student.” – No. And if I did have dreams they wouldn’t have been around academic 
achievement that’s for sure.  
Why did I do well then? After years of struggle? In all honesty it was not an act of 
me achieving my best and becoming master of my destiny, it was the opposite, it was me 
submitting to the system. I had to memorize for tests, I had to force creative ideas to 
overcome my bad fine motor skills, I had to force myself to say things I didn’t believe 
and do things I didn’t want to do in order to get grades that I felt meant nothing.   
But of course that’s life. I can hear it ringing in my fucking ears, it ripples from 
the empty factory lots and the abandoned railway yards of my home, you do a job that 
you hate and the more you hate it the more real a job it is and that’s life.     
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And the people slave for this drivel, to prove themselves masculine or real or 
valuable, they slave at these fucking jobs and hate everyone who doesn’t submit to them.  
Well where’s your fucking factory job now you exploited wretches? What has your slave 
mentality given you other than a robbed pension and brain dead kids? Fuck you and your 
whole warped mentality of work, as if you’ve somehow braved the elements of crushing  
exploitation to come out victoriously unemployed and disillusioned.   
At the pub, next to the empty railway station, down the road from the empty 
factories, I can hear their wheezing racist excuses “Oh it’s the vindictive Chinese or the 
lazy Mexicans taking our jobs” or their self-loathing excuses “Well we’ve had it good for 
too long it’s time to pay the piper” JESUS FUCKING CHRIST THE FACTORY WORK  
IS GONE AND ALL WE HAVE IS WALMART AND FASTFOOD JOBS OR 
BULLSHIT TEMP WORK YOU MIND NUMBED FUCKS!    
Blossom close – Blossom close.   
Back home the old Ford plant and railway stations are unimaginably big and 
empty. The real square foot number cannot communicate the real magnitude of their big 
empty space because it’s the kind of thing that can only be felt when you stand directly in 
it. I’ve walked through these big empty spaces countless times and still often do now, 
usually with my head down until I’m all the way through, but sometimes I’ll just stop and 
stand in the middle of the empty railway yard until I feel the full weight of its emptiness 
in my gut, and I’ll think about all the lives and all the working hands that made it move 
and made it live for so long until its cold calculated death, and I’ll get this sensation like 
there’s low hanging fruit about to burst just behind my eyes while a slow visceral ache 
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sets in until I begin to crumble inwards towards an enclosed hopelessness. But then I’ll 
see the strings of weeds bursting out of the slabs of concrete, I’ll hear the whistling wind 
against the crumbling panels, and I’ll feel the bright sun peeling off the old lead paint, 
and suddenly I know, I know that the empty factories and abandoned railway yards aren’t 
crumbling…they’re being displaced, and that it’s really just the mechanical shell falling 
away from the budding plant, and like the crack of dawn the enclosure in my chest 
reverses and becomes a force, a force that goes from interior to exterior, not as a will but 
as an opening up, until the sun, and the wind, and the emptiness stop drowning me and 
instead go through me and I’m swept off in a smooth peaceful river. Finally I’ll grab a 
rock and throw it through one of its many windows, and then I’ll walk away with the big 
secret, which is that the despair and silence of its emptiness is a sham, and its mourned 
loss is all in vain, because all material death is really just the movement of life at varying 
speeds.     
Blossom close – Blossom close.  
Sam was long gone at this point swept off somewhere and the afternoon was 
bright – the first real spring day that year. The day when everything feels green and 
growing and I think isn’t life okay? Mr. Smith took us out on the grass to sit and chat 
about literature and our choices for university or college or work once we graduated.  
What are you going to do next year Luke?   
I submitted. In a way there was an end in the road and nowhere left to go, It felt like I had 
to start swimming or start drowning – What are you going to do next year Luke?   
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I’m going to learn the system, become the system, wear its clothing and learn its 
logic. If I learn how to learn, and learn how to teach than there isn’t anything I can’t do, 
and I can teach others to do the same. I will become a master of teaching and a master of 
learning, the all-learning all-becoming master being of transitions, a chameleon, a 
charlatan, a slave, a tyrant whatever I needed to be, I would master the system that had so 
fiendishly tried to master me. I wasn’t going to just “play the game” I was going to learn 
its rules, get my hands on the pieces and start moving them around, or maybe just for a 
laugh I’d flip the whole fucking board.  
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As outlined in my methodology, there are two main sources I drew from for my 
evocative writing, one being the concrete artefact itself and its details, the other being my 
memories or traces of affect. The evocative writing is thus a way to provide context of the 
relationships and affects that conceived the concrete artefact. In this way it acts as an 
extension of the concrete artefact and also an addition or contextualization. In the 
following analysis, the concrete artefact or the object will be artefact 1a (and 
subsequently 2a,3a,4a,5a), while the evocative writing that it evokes will be referred to as 
1b (and subsequently 2b,3b,4b,5b).        
The goal of this chapter is to continue the intensity of each Artefact from its 
concrete version to its evocative writing to the concepts needed to analyze it. This chapter 
will be an analysis in regards to seeking what concepts are produced by the evocative 
writing, which will then be applied in a more systematic version in the following chapter.   
Generating Concepts  
Deleuze’s affinity for Spinoza is two-fold and is perhaps best characterized by  
Deleuze (1995) himself: “the paradox in Spinoza is that he’s the most philosophical of 
philosophers, the purest in some sense, but also the one who more than any other 
addresses nonphilosophers and calls forth the most intense nonphilosophical 
understanding” (p.165).  Here we have the dual nature of Deleuze’s Spinoza; on the one 
hand we have the great pure ontologist, the philosopher of philosophers, while on the 
other hand we have the one thinker who according to Deleuze (1988) best “teaches the 
philosopher how to become a nonphilosopher” (p.130). Deleuze (1995) had similar 
comments regarding the reception of Anti-Oedipus (1977), in which he found that those 
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who had “read lots of other books, and psychoanalytical books in particular” were most 
resistant to it or found it “really difficult” (p.7). And yet by no means should AntiOedipus 
be considered a non-academic book according to Deleuze (1995), who describes the book 
as “academic” and “fairly serious” in regards to its strategic ambition (p.7). This mixed 
response is why Deleuze considered the book to be geared towards young people, 
presuming that the majority of them had not yet been tied down by predominant 
assumptions about what it is thinking should be.   
A term that Deleuze (1995) used for these “predominated assumptions” is the 
“Image of thought”, which according to Deleuze functions as “prephilosophy” or 
“precedes philosophy” (p.8). Deleuze (1995) describes it as thus:  
According to this image, thought has an affinity with the true; it formally 
possesses the true and materially wants the true. It is in terms of this image that 
everybody knows and is presumed to know what it means to think. Thereafter it 
matters little whether philosophy begins with the object or the subject, with Being 
or beings, as long as thought remains subject to this Image which already 
prejudges everything: The distribution of the object and the subject as well as that 
of Being and beings. We may call this image of thought a dogmatic, orthodox or 
moral image. (as cited in Dahlbeck, 2014, p.15)  
This dogmatic image as Deleuze refers to it, is an abstract ideal that trumps the immediate 
relationships at hand or “it presupposes itself and in the process makes it very difficult to 
refute on an individual basis” (Dahlbeck, 2014, p.16). The goal of this chapter then is to 
look for affects that produce concepts, not to apply concepts (as images) to affect or these 
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artefacts. I am not going to explain these artefacts, but rather engage with them through a 
process of “affective reading” in which rather than search for some signifier to 
regurgitate, I will explicate how it is these artefacts function, first through some basic 
thematic observations followed by a generating of conceptual tools (as outlined in my 
Literature) that may hold insight into how it is the pieces are functioning. This process of 
affective reading will thus be generative rather than transcendent in terms of explicating 
useful concepts. These concepts will then be used in a more systematic way in the next 
chapter.      
 “Distinguishing” concepts as opposed to “Determining” concepts  
Spinoza draws out the important difference between distinguishing and 
determining. For Spinoza, “distinguishing” is a positive act whereas “determining” is a 
negative one (Deleuze, 1988). If I choose to distinguish between a student and teacher 
rather than determine one over the other, I avoid negating the one term by the other. The 
teacher being this or that is only in regards to that specific fleeting moment and its 
function; it does not condition what a student is or how it functions. Thus being a teacher 
can have the same characteristics as being a student. Being a teacher means many things, 
many of which include that of a student; they only differ in certain contexts, at different 
speeds. When I choose to play the part of the teacher or the part of a student it can be in 
flashes or in drawn out movements.  
The point of defining a teacher and student in this way, is that it gives flexibility 
to the terms, makes them adaptive and useful for generating concepts. It plucks them 
from the transcendent ontology of the dogmatic image and makes them functional for the 
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different ways the teacher-student-affect dynamic is produced. Johan Dahlbeck (2014) 
describes this well:   
From this perspective, the individual bodies of children and pedagogues are most 
readily understood as instances abstractly related to a general category and 
therefore treated as several instances of the same, functioning chiefly to fix the 
position of that which they are not; true, good and one. If on the other hand, as the 
ontological turn of Spinoza argues for, the individual bodies of children and 
pedagogues are understood rather as singularities harbouring flows of power, 
what defines them is not their abstract relation to a general category – that may 
never be experienced due to the physical limitations of the body – but the actual 
forces that they posses and the affects that impact the body when its powers come 
up against external powers i.e. that which they are capable of doing…And 
because the configurations of two bodies will never posses the same exact powers 
then they will therefore never be reducible to the mere instances of the same. In 
that sense, they are singular, they are unique, and they perform in specific ways 
that do not correspond exactly with pre-existing patterns. (p.18)   
Artefact 1ab-2ab: Ordering subjectivities through language, images and memory  
Artefact 1a was written by my kindergarten teacher for my parents. It is a monthly 
summative assessment, and a snippet of a collection of written correspondences between 
them. Structured into categories it is a good example of standard formative assessment 
practices meant to break a student into abstract categories of different functions (Pinar, 
2012). The first half of the evocative writing is me trying to generate any form of distinct 
memories that I label as “images” and “flashes”. All of the memoires mentioned are 
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regarding the classroom setting or engagements with other students with no recollection 
of a teacher. Artefact 1ab is ambiguous in terms of the teacher because there is no name 
attached to the document, but also because I have no memory of any of my kindergarten 
teachers. Although there is no evidence in regards to a name of a teacher that is not to say 
there is no teacher here because I think the effects of a teacher are still present in this 
regard. By that I mean there is no teacher in the anthropomorphic sense but there is 
certainly an organizing presence, specifically the thing I refer to as “a voice” that I recite 
near the end of artefact 1b. What artefact 1a shows, is how the language of the teacher 
functions in terms of how it shapes me as a student and thus also itself.  
I sum it up when I say that “I have no idea who this kid is: ‘Lukas’”.  Other than a 
few distinct memories of flashes, there is little difference in terms of how far away the 
student here is, in terms of time and memory, as the teacher, the only difference being I 
know the name of the student. In fact the student “Lukas” takes on many forms and 
responds to memories differently. Lukas the rebel, the lover, the fool, all of these 
personifications help distinguish me in some way or another as a subject and child. But 
what I think is of most value here is that this artefact is purely running on functions, how 
the teacher functions and how the student functions in tandem and how this operates 
through language. The first two artefacts generate two distinct concepts that need to be 
drawn out and analyzed within Spinozist ontology. These two distinct concepts are that of 
language and images which have major implications in regards to their exact function.   
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Images4 are traces of bodies that have come into contact with it, as Deleuze  
(1988) claims; “The only ideas we have under the natural conditions of our perception are 
the ideas that represent what happens to our body, the effect of another body on ours, that 
is a mixing of both bodies. They are necessarily inadequate…such ideas are images. Or 
rather, images are the corporeal affections themselves, the traces of an external body on 
our body” (p.73). There are other important concepts in here that need to be further 
unwrapped in order to understand Deleuze’s meaning and how it is exactly the concept of 
images functions in relations to these other concepts. Images are impressed upon us when 
we come into contact with other bodies, which leave traces on us, as images, which 
correspond with the corporeal affections/affects that we experienced at the moment of 
encounter. The nature of these encounters however, is very complicated and contextual 
thus we often only experience a minimal amount of the possibly experienced, and often 
the ordering of these images is superficial. This is an important point that Spinoza makes:  
“the ideas that we have of external bodies indicate the constitution of our own body more 
than the nature of external bodies.”(II,16, C2)(p.77). Another important distinction 
Spinoza makes is that “although the external bodies by which the human body has once 
been affected may no longer exist, the mind will regard them as present wherever this 
activity of the body is repeated” (II, 16, p.2)(p.78). Which means that even though the 
bodies I have come into contact with may be gone, such as in these experiences, they 
provoke a specific response in me that is constituted by other bodies or events.   
                                                 
4 It is important to note that Deleuze (1988) equates images with ideas, and that this interpretation is not 
necessarily shared by Spinoza. However it is Deleuze’s use of image within Spinoza as well as Deleuze’s 
own work that I draw primarily from when using this concept of image in this thesis.       
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According to Spinoza, “If the human body has once been affected by two or more 
bodies at the same time, when the mind after words imagines one of them, it will 
straightway remember the others too” (II, prop.18) (p.79). Spinoza equates this sequence 
of ideas and affections with memory: “Hence we clearly understand what memory is. It is 
simply a linking of ideas involving the nature of things outside the human body, a linking 
which occurs in the mind parallel to the order and linking of the affections of the human 
body.” (II, prop.18, scho.). For Spinoza “we clearly understand why the mind from 
thinking of one thing, should straight away pass on to thinking of another thing which has 
no likeness to the first.”   
This process of association has important elements that Spinoza explicates; when 
we experience affections/affects of bodies in a certain order (as perceived by the 
intellect), we then associate these affections with the reoccurring sequential body; thus 
we have memories in sequences of images of external bodies, which also applies to and is 
concurrent with language. Spinoza gives a specific example of how language functions as 
a series of bodies and affections: “For example, from thinking of the word ‘pomum’ 
(apple) a Roman will straightway fall to thinking of the fruit, which has no likeness to 
that articulated sound nor anything in common with it other than that the man’s body has 
often been affected by them both; that is, the man has often heard the word ‘pomum’ 
while seeing fruit. So everyone will pass on from one thought to another according as 
habit in his body” (II, prop 18, school) (p.79).   
Thus according to these concepts discussed above, the use of language in terms of 
a relationship between signifier/signified is volatile at best. This is also in sequence with 
the fact that we do not even know the true nature of the bodies affecting us because they 
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are embedded within our nature of ourselves. These encounters with sounds and objects 
or enunciations and experiences are not necessarily erratic; language is an ordering 
according to Deleuze and Guattari (1987), who define the “order-word” of language, and 
describe its function as a command on life: “language isn’t life it gives life orders” (p.71). 
Language according to Deleuze and Guattari, acts redundantly, it brings in and collects; 
one does not say what one has seen but what one has been told; language is 
communicated as a code that is then applied to experience and subjectivity in terms of 
commands. This is the form of language that is so ominous here in these two artefacts, the 
first being my anonymous teacher or “the voice” which is building me into a child, into 
all the categories of the assessment sheet, but from the content written and the tone it was 
written in, I’m not a child yet, not yet ordered properly, and it is clear from her assurances 
at the end that it is only a matter of time before I learn the language and am ordered into 
being a child. In this regard, the second artefact can thus be seen as me learning the tools 
of language although the voice of the teacher needs to come in and fix my mistakes, order 
me into using it properly, in this sense I have come a long way from babbling to writing.   
And now in Artefact 2a,b there is a human face to the teacher, and a more human 
relationship, things are less blurry and the mass of life in artefact 1a,b has been narrowed 
down in just a few years to more anthropomorphic shapes and images. In the second 
Artefact there are human subjects, a clear student and a clear teacher because there is a 
language in place to order them into those forms, within these constructs of subjectivity, 
affect pulsates – it distributes, builds up and tears down.    
The teacher in artefact 2a is the spelling correction or “the correction”. This is a 
continuing of the theme of language as an authoritative form that originated in artefact 
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1ab. Fixing my grammatical errors could be seen as a direct act of the order word 
(Deleuze & Guattari) or as a command. In 2b, the cold correction of the artefact takes on 
a new form, more complicated and human. The teacher has become Mrs. Smith, an 
approachable hard-nosed teacher. These are her performances anyways; she has 
developed subjectivity. The teacher is really the center of my evocative piece, in that she 
composes the two main images of my memory of artefact 2a. The first image of her at the 
front of the room while the second is of her in hallway crying. The distinct features of her 
are real; she is a person. She personifies what would be considered a good teacher; 
manages the classroom with an authoritative tone, still approachable by the students.   
In artefact 2a, the student is wrong and in need of correction. In a position of lack:  
a lack of grammatical knowledge or skill. The student in artefact 2b is a more vivid image 
of me, less distant then the “Lukas” in artefact 1. Here I have a closer student in both 
memory and time. It is a much more concrete student that has thoughts and feelings, a 
perspective. There are some details that are important. His wondering out into nature, into 
books, clouds, and the tree. His response to the exposure is an all-out cry that is, after all, 
the only way he cries, “with his whole body” whereas the teacher cries “subtly and in 
control”. The student’s position is based around the teacher’s actions, and when the 
student wanders off, they are ripped back into the centering of the teacher. Language is 
not the only tool at work here; there’s the displaying of the journal, the pulling out into 
the hallway, the subtle tear. All these images speak to the student and at the end it is the 
tearful face that trumps all forms of language for the student, and leaves him in a state of 
confusion, beyond cognizant capabilities.   
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Artefact 3ab – Welcome to Class Sam  
The first two artefacts are more detailed in terms of my experiences, but this piece 
reads more as a reflection in that I am much more critical and engaged with this piece, its 
closer and much more agitating.  At first it seems Sam is clearly oppressed and that the 
teacher is the one to blame. It could be framed as a series of actions between individuals 
that my teacher oppressed Sam, but I think it’s clear from discussion regarding the 
teacher, that she was not solely to blame for Sam’s struggles, and that there is much more 
context that contributed to the relationship than either of them recognized.   
It is within a presupposed vacuum of context that the relationship between the 
teacher and Sam became hostile and deteriorated for them both as a student and as a 
teacher. Sam’s withdrawal from the class setting and his relationship with the teacher is a 
response to more systemic forces of oppression. There is a clear distinction here between  
Sam’s personal home and the classroom, in terms of language, values and habits. Both 
the student and teacher here are victims. The teacher is more responsible given their 
access to the tools of the system as Freire (1971) considers the teacher to be the driving 
force of oppression or liberation within the classroom, but is it all conscious?   
Sam’s dejection could be seen as a purely class issue, in line with Paul Willis’ 
(1977) discoveries of Learning to Labour, in which working class kids fail into their roles 
because of different values systems. But there is something more complicated here, less 
methodical but with equally devastating results. Unlike artefact 2b, artefact 3b is fully 
centered around the student. Not me but Sam who is really the center of this piece.  
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Artefact 3a is about “success” and work and what it means to do those things. Artefact 3b 
is about class, and about how students and teachers relate to each other within classrooms 
based on other forms of value than affect. What forms of value is at work and who 
decides and has access to it?  
The relationships in artefact 3 are examples of how schools often operate in a 
vacuum detached from its larger context. By this I mean what Giroux (1983) terms as  
“positivist paradigm of rationality” and the undermining of any form of democratic or 
common good. It is the reduction of value or meaning to the individual student and the 
mechanics of the classroom environment. Within this paradigm students behaviours and 
work ethic are solely a result of their individual will and nothing further. All social 
inequalities such as poverty and race are discounted as contributing variables to human 
behaviour. In Spinozist terms, it’s the reducing of effects from their cause through the use 
of inadequate ideas. What Spinoza (2000) means by this is that the larger the context in 
which causes are understood to be related to the effects, the more adequate the ideas and 
the actions they propose. What artefact 3b displays is a series of actions based on 
minimal causes, thus the ideas are inadequate and the actions taken become effects 
without known causes.   
Reduced to objective quantification of an abstract value within a setting deserted 
of all exterior influence, students and teachers are created not in struggle or even in 
relation with exterior conditions but in competition and as lacking abstract ideas (Pinar, 
2012).  Within this context Sam was a student who had severe lack and who was also 
wholly responsible for his decisions. As a result Sam fell into the narrative that he did not 
do work because he lacked discipline, intelligence or any other individualist trait. These 
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labels were used to sever Sam from his subjectivity as an engagement of relations of 
context, there was nothing wrong with Sam’s context but rather within him, it severed 
him from the greater causes of his effects. This evocative writing acts as a 
recontexualization of Sam, a re-examining of Sam within his larger context and thus 
builds a more adequate depiction of him, an image that was absent from his actual lived 
experience.    
In this vacuum of context there is a narrowing of the functioning of affect, of 
subjectivities and of the relations among us. Sam closes himself off and produces 
minimal work and becomes stoic, and Mrs. Thompson attempts to express concern and to 
help Sam but through a narrow reductionist perspective that ends up hurting Sam and 
ultimately deteriorates any meaningful relationship between them.   
What Sam’s “space” is exactly is also important. Sam’s space is his distancing 
from authority; it is a creative space that allowed him to explore and create and in this 
way Sam benefited from it as did I. But it was also because of this space given to him that 
he struggled so much in the classroom setting, and why doing the myriad little tasks of 
school was so disheartening and unappealing to him. Like I said in the evocative writing, 
Sam was real working class where I was second generation; by this I mean it as Annette 
Lareau (2003, 2015) does, in that working class or poor students are given more space to 
explore and create but as a consequence often struggle with institutional norms, 
specifically around authority, etiquette and the “playing the game” mentality, which are 
challenging to adapt to because they are so foreign to their everyday lives, whereas 
middle class children are more easily coopted or coerced into these institutions. This is a 
large component of this piece, what are these forms of values and etiquettes materially? 
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They are the way we move our bodies and the tone or use of our language, the specific 
ways we attempt to organize or chorus our affects. The way we use our bodies and our 
enunciations to impose certain images or certain affections.      
Artefact 4ab – Affect and Subjectivities   
This artefact relies heavily on my time in teacher’s college and my work in 
classrooms teaching. The teacher in here is me, but also the lesson template. The way the 
lesson template functions is similar to how I function as a teacher. As a teacher, I outlined 
the most common mistake I made which is constructing and implementing lessons that  
are too “manipulative” and idea driven. These lessons often were too conclusive in that I 
assumed to know the reactions certain activities or questions would get. This had two 
side effects, either the students would get frustrated and anxious because they could not 
get a specific answer correct or they would think of a response that was completely in 
line with the criteria that I had never thought of. In the second case, this meant that I had 
to reign them into what it was I was trying to get at, which would mean squashing their 
ideas in the process, whereas in the first case I would adapt to these new ideas 
consequently abandoning my lesson plan. The problem was I had certain material I had to 
cover and ditching the lesson template meant it was a wasted day. The lesson template is 
described as a boulder and as a hijacker. And I make explicitly clear that the affect here 
are the ripples that I give off during my generative lesson planning. The ripples go from 
the signifier whether it be a picture, or word or story to which the student’s response act 
as their own ripples to each other and myself.   
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Artefact 4b describes a hostile environment towards subjectivity and affect. 
Hostile in the sense that the classroom does not attempt an abrupt stifling of affect from 
being generated but instead attempts to navigate which affects it is that are generated and 
through which subjectivities. How is that institutions produce subjectivities then? Hardt 
and Negri (2000) claim that “the enclosures that used to define the limited space of the 
institutions have broken down so that the logic that once functioned primarily within the 
institutional walls now spreads across the entire social terrain. Inside and outside are 
becoming indistinguishable” (p.196). This is what the intimate detail of Foucault’s work 
outlines, how exactly it is that disciplinary practices produce themselves immanently and 
subjectively within “biopower” (Hardt & Negri, 2000). According to Hardt and Negri 
(2000), “Biopower is a form of power that regulates social life from its interior, following 
it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and rearticulating it. Biopower thus refers to a situation in 
which what is directly at stake in power is the production and reproduction of life itself”  
(pp. 24-25). In the context of the school it is not the principle’s discipline but the habits 
and mannerisms of the students that enact them (as biopower) that produce the 
institutions as they are. Thus the role of the principle, as the one in power, is an illusion. 
The great force of biopower is what hangs in the back of your head as a teacher in the 
guise of “what if today these kids just decide not listen to me?” This is the dreaded 
feeling that makes some teachers into dictators and others into saints, the former looking 
to squash any sense of creative interaction, while the latter pleads and guilt’s them not to 
do so.   
This process of institutions separating people from the means of producing 
themselves (in expressing a surplus) is fundamental to capitalism. In the words of Marx, 
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this is the social relation that holds variable capital to constant capital, in that the factory 
worker (variable capital) has always had the ability to produce a surplus but lacked the 
means of doing so in the form of machines (constant capital) (Hardt & Negri, 2009). 
Hardt and Negri (2009) claim that now in the capitalism of biopower the space between 
variable capital and constant capital (or our ability to express ourselves subjectively) has 
never been weaker. Students today have never had more powerful tools for learning at 
their disposal and this is a fundamental anxiety among many administrators, characterized 
by demands that students not bring in what they have learned “out there”.    
In the context of schools, in the discipline society, schools were in charge of producing 
subjectivities aligned with factory workers; in the context of biopower, it is the 
subjectivities themselves as they are produced that is the drive of production and 
accumulation (Hardt and Negri, 2009). This is just one example of why schools find 
themselves in crisis structurally speaking. The most important point is that public schools 
are no longer needed simply because they were constructed to serve specific economic 
ends that no longer exist. During industrial capital schools were responsible for 
producing certain subjectivities that maintained production and the separation of people 
from the means to produce value, whereas now it is the producing of subjectivities 
themselves that produce value thus the tools for doing so are immediate and always 
shifting.   
Artefact 5ab – Class/Subjectivity/Affect  
The tone of artefact 5b does a fair job capturing the anger of my experience in 
undergrad in sync with my desperation. There are some touchy moments in here that I am 
not particularly comfortable with, but these are the terms and ways I navigated those 
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encounters during that time so they are wholly relevant. It is true that most of the students 
and teachers in my education program were indeed middle class and white so the harsh 
language and reductionist arguments are not necessarily untrue but still only contain 
elements of truth. But this is only in retrospect, whereas back then they were ultimate 
truths simply because they seemed wholly ignored, and ones I could not escape.  
My relationship with class here is at a threshold, in that by this point I had become 
fully aware of the class distinction but not of how it was I was supposed to maneuver 
within it. It just was never a comfortable either/or dichotomy that I felt workable, in that 
moments acting working class and moments of acting middle class are actually pretty 
ambivalent, and at one point any form of disregard for academic etiquette was all 
posturing with no benefits other than acting submissive as a docile body. If being middle 
class is just an act, just a set of mannerisms and patterns of behaviour, an external 
interchange between bodies, then being working class was supposed to be the rejection of 
this superficial surface level of exchange. The only problem then is what then is it am I 
trying to express in terms of identity? Is there something in me that is best expressed as a 
certain set of body movements and patterns of enunciations or is it all an act? Is there any 
such thing as a pure expression of oneself? If all interactions are the web of social 
hegemonic forces then what do I resist with? How do I act? How do I be?     
I’m not working class or middle class, because there is nothing in me; these are 
both performances and I am comfortable with both, so what real benefits can I get from 
them beyond communication in terms of the immediate experiences of acting them out. 
There is another threshold here, then, a threshold of language, in that it seems to be 
falling short. My explanation of testing Hans may be a tool to understand him, but it is 
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also limiting because as long as I am hiding something introspectively, denying my 
absolute presence materially, I am not fully in the experience in terms of affect. There is 
this unceasing movement below the surface of my interactions, which exists from years 
of resistance, of being stuck in material conditions that I could not get out of so I escaped 
mentally. In terms of being in the moment, it is in a way an insincere practice.   
My description of Hans’ and my series of exchanges took place in his office 
during a directed reading. As outlined in artefact b it consisted of readings and discussion 
of said readings once a week for an hour, sometimes more. My descriptions of our 
encounters distinguishes an important point, first that I became aware of my actions as 
performances of resistance, but also experienced what Freire (2005) would label a  
“reengagement of subjectivity”. By this I mean that it was the first time that knowledge 
became something to be done and valued in the moment. The theories and topics we 
discussed felt immediately relevant to my immediate context, and thus gave me the 
ability act within it. Even if this action was completely introspective in terms of 
understanding certain discourses or phenomena around my everyday life, either within 
the larger political domain or my own personal affairs, the barrier between the 
obtainment of knowledge versus the use of knowledge becomes instant rather than 
deterred. By this I mean that knowledge stopped being an abstract storage of information 
to be applied in a later context and instead became wholly immediate.   
In Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed, the distinction between class is vague 
because it is within the context of 1970’s Brazil which had a much more distinct class 
system; thus the boundaries between the oppressed and the oppressors was fairly distinct.  
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Although Freire’s outline of class consciousness is relevant (in terms of hegemonic forces 
and false consciousness) for all educators it does not wholly explore my frustration and 
struggle with class and subjectivity. Hardt and Negri’s (2004) concept of the multitude, 
however, holds much more potential for a more intimate conceptual understanding of my 
frustrations.   
According to Hardt and Negri (2004), “Class is determined by struggle” (p.104).  
But unlike traditional Marxist conceptions of class, that rely on unity of the proletariat.  
The multitude does not homogenize subjectivities, as Hardt and Negri (2004) put it “there 
is a potentially infinite number of classes that compromise contemporary society based 
not only on economic differences but also on those of race, geography, gender, sexuality, 
and other factors”; therefore, “the mandate to choose between unity and multiplicity 
treats class as if it were merely an empirical concept and fails to take into consideration 
the extent to which class itself is defined politically” (pp. 103-104). This inclusion of 
subjectivity and unity not as a juxtaposition to be supervised by an elite class, but as 
complimentary and positive distinction, is not just for convenience of argument but also 
aligns the current “existing conditions for the potential  collective struggle” which makes 
this cohesion a materially justifiable claim. According to Hardt and Negri (2004), it is the 
new material conditions of labour that compose this possibility. These conditions of 
labour are becoming more and more aligned with the conditions of life itself; thus “labour 
cannot be limited to waged labour but must refer to human creative capacities in all their 
generality” (p.105). This new conceptual formation of class provides me with a better 
tool for dealing with my personal struggles with class and actions as being expressive vs 
contingent.  
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Artefact 6ab – Productions and Resolutions   
Artefact 6 is regarding the context of my home and how I came into contact with 
it and still do. It is initially obvious to me that the historical development of St.Thomas 
can be seen as a form of contextualising my experiences, and also that the most pressing 
symbol of global capitalism is the empty Ford plant and railway stations in my home 
town. What this piece is really focusing on and what I think it offers in terms of 
understanding affect is how it is I deal with the relentless consciousness of my political 
context. The teacher-student dichotomy here takes different forms throughout the piece.  
There is a human teacher here; near the end I mention “Mr. Smith” who was an English 
teacher in my grade 12 year, and I discuss the decision I made to get good grades and go 
to university. I phrase this decision as a “submission” rather than an act of will, which is 
an important distinction because an act of will implies going against my context whereas 
I feel I am submitting to one rather than the other.   
There are in fact two contexts here and a force of desire and how all these operate 
is of most significance to this piece. To distinguish between the two apparent contexts is 
important. There seems to be a “mechanical production or growth” through the majority 
of the piece until the end when a new form of production is realized. The specific 
paragraph below is important and I think speaks the most to my navigating the different 
forms of production and my understanding of affect. Here is the paragraph I think is most 
important for discussion:   
“Back home the old Ford plant and railway stations are unimaginably big and empty. The 
real square foot number cannot communicate the real magnitude of their big empty space 
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because it’s the kind of thing that can only be felt when you stand directly in it. I’ve 
walked through these big empty spaces countless times and still often do now, usually 
with my head down until I’m all the way through, but sometimes I’ll just stop and stand 
in the middle of the empty railway yard until I feel the full weight of its emptiness in my 
gut, and I’ll think about all the lives and all the working hands that made it move and 
made it live for so long until its cold calculated death, and I’ll get this sensation like 
there’s low hanging fruit about to burst just behind my eyes while a slow visceral ache 
sets in until I begin to crumble inwards towards an enclosed hopelessness. But then I’ll 
see the strings of weeds bursting out of the slabs of concrete, I’ll hear the whistling wind 
against the crumbling panels, and I’ll feel the bright sun peeling off the old lead paint, 
and suddenly I know, I know that the empty factories and abandoned railway yards aren’t 
crumbling…they’re being displaced, and that it’s really just the mechanical shell falling 
away from the budding plant, and like the crack of dawn the enclosure in my chest 
reverses and becomes a force, a force that goes from interior to exterior, not as a will but 
as an opening up, until the sun, and the wind, and the emptiness stop drowning me and 
instead go through me and I’m swept off in a smooth peaceful river. Finally I’ll grab a 
rock and throw it through one of its many windows, and then I’ll walk away with the big 
secret, which is that the despair and silence of its emptiness is a sham, and its mourned 
loss is all in vain, because all material death is really just the movement of life at varying 
speeds.”     
There is a mental process going on here which I think acts as a kind of climatic 
resolution. Here I am coming to terms with the two different forms of production that I 
feel are contextualizing me at that moment. The first is the production of global 
103 
 
capitalism, its history and determination, but also the immanent production of Spinoza 
ontology, or what could be categorized as life. The relationship between global capitalist 
production, as represented by the empty factories, and Spinoza’s ontological production, 
as represented as by the natural elements or “budding plant”, are best characterized 
conceptually by Antonio Negri’s Savage Anomaly, while my intimate navigation of these 
two productions can be explored using Spinoza’s Ethics. In regards to the differing forms 
of production, one being the capitalist form of production and the other an immanent 
production, Antonio Negri (1981) describes their relationship as follows:  
capitalist exploitation is the command of a relationship, it is the function of an 
organization: It is mediation, always and only mediation of the productive forces. 
It is the individuality of interests that is superimposed on the collective process of 
the appropriation (transformation plus constitution) of nature detached from the 
productive forces. It is the mystification of value that privatizes the reality of the 
extraction of surplus values. It is fetishism against productive force (p.139).   
This is a dense quote that needs to be dissected a bit in order to arrange the complexities 
of immanent production and capitalist production. According to Negri here, there is no 
capitalist production, or the creation of surplus value, without immanent production. For 
example the factories were not built by Ford the corporation, they were built by human 
hands and human minds as labour and were maintained by such. The factory/rail yard 
were built and put into function through human labour and the transformation of raw 
materials. In terms of this quote, capitalist production is the ordering of immanent 
production into profits and acts as an apparatus that consumes its surplus value (Hardt 
and Negri 2009). But life or generative ontology always produces a surplus, by that I 
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mean subjectivities and relationships within sites of capitalist command still produce 
outside or beyond the apparatus of capitalist appropriation (Skott-Myhre, 2008)  
   Prior to this, regarding artefact 1&2, I explored Spinoza’s conceptions of images as 
traces of bodies in sequence (order) felt through the affections of the bodies and how this 
is related to language and memory as an order of experienced events which are redirected 
within consciousness as language and ideas (images). These concepts were used to 
explore the ‘voice’ of language in the first two artefacts in terms of how the voice was 
expressed, but now I want to direct these concepts and push them further in terms of 
understanding and articulating what exactly is going on in this paragraph as a series of 
ideas and affections.   
To do this I am going to push deeper into Spinoza beyond the propositions 
discussed earlier and further into Book III, IV and V. The challenge of writing about 
Spinoza’s Ethics is its style. Presented as a series of propositions followed be digressing 
logical arguments the Ethics flows in sequential but interrelated arguments. It is difficult 
to just pick one proposition or even a selected few (as I have done here) without including 
the other many concepts that they relate to. But the scope of such an analysis is beyond 
this work so for now I will just use a select few that can help understand my thinking 
process here.  
In Book III there is a series of propositions that address the tenuous relation 
between bodies as encounters and the internalizing of these encounters into human 
consciousness. The concept of human consciousness that could be derived from these 
propositions is one of flux which consists of fleeting impressions.  
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Proposition 23: “The mind does not know itself except in so far as it perceives 
ideas of affections of the body.”   
Proposition 24: “The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the 
component parts of the human body.”   
Proposition 25: “The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve an 
adequate knowledge of an external body”. (p. 81-82).      
These propositions are then summarized by proposition 28 which states that “the 
ideas of the affections of the human body, in so far as they are related only to the human 
mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused”(p.83). Spinoza explains this further when 
he states that “Therefore these ideas of affections, in so far as they are related only to the 
human mind, are like conclusions without premises; that is, as is self-evident, confused 
ideas.” Pr.28 proof (p.84). And further in Pr.29: “Hence it follows that whenever the 
human mind perceives things after the common order of nature, it does not have an 
adequate knowledge of itself, nor of its body, nor of external bodies, but only a confused 
and fragmentary knowledge. (p.84).   
Thus the figure of human consciousness that these few propositions and further 
descriptions outline is one of a very confused and hopeless state, as if one can never truly 
know the world or even ones’ self. According to this, we are impressed with fragments of 
things and events that are beyond our full understanding, and thus live and suffer by these  
“conclusions without premises”.  This state of being is what Spinoza refers to as being  
“passive”, as he further outlines in Book IV Proposition 2 when he states that “We are 
said to be passive when something arises in us of which we are only the partial cause: 
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that is, something that cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our own nature.” 
(p.156).    
Spinoza then begins to set-up how it is exactly this passivity is to be overcome, 
when in Proposition 5 he states: “The essence of a passive emotion cannot be explicated 
through our own essence alone: that is, the power of a passive emotion cannot be defined 
by the power whereby we endeavor to persist in our own being, but must necessarily be 
defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own power.” (p.158-159). 
This state of passivity is thus not something that can be overcome through will or desire 
alone because it is wholly dependent on context but also because it is confined within a 
series of images that constitute inadequate ideas.   
Spinoza then outlines how emotions and their affections can only be produced or 
trumped by other emotions or affections in terms of how they function within 
consciousness: “An emotion, in so far as it is related to the mind, is an idea whereby the 
mind affirms a greater or lesser force of existence of its body than was previously the 
case. So when the mind is assailed by an emotion, the body at the same time is affected 
by an affection whereby its power of acting is increased or diminished”. (prop. 7, proof.) 
(p.158).   
Spinoza then explicates, in Proposition 9, how the immediacy of the emotions and 
their subsequent affections are the strongest in the moment of their encounter: “An 
emotion whose cause we think to be with us in the present is stronger than it would be if 
we did not think the said cause to be with us.” And further: “The image of a thing future 
or past, that is, a thing which we regard as related to future or past time to the exclusion 
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of present time, is feebler, other things being equal, than the image of a present thing. 
Consequently the emotion towards a thing future or past, other things being equal, is 
weaker than an emotion towards a present thing.”(p.159-160). Thus the images I have 
experienced are not as strong as the affections of the current encounters being 
experienced, however the images of inadequate ideas make it difficult for me to remove 
myself from past experiences or future angst, the overwhelming of the empty factory as 
the overall poltical/historical forces make me passive or as I refer to it in the artefact 6b 
“enclosure” of “hopelessness”. A final note in regards to this seemingly hopeless state,  
Spinoza claims: “But human power is very limited and is infinitely surpassed by the 
power of external causes, and so we do not have absolute power to adapt to our purposes 
things external to us…And so in so far as we rightly understand these matters, the 
endeavor of the better part of us is in harmony with the order of the whole of Nature” 
(p.200).  
In Book V Spinoza beings a series of propositions that are intended to draw out 
how to engage with the challenges outlined above:   
Proposition 1: “The affections of the body, that is, the images of things, are 
arranged and connected in the body in exactly the same way as thoughts and the ideas of 
things are arranged and connected in the mind.” Which he further details: “Therefore, just 
as the order and connection of ideas in the mind occurs in accordance with the order and 
connection of the affections of the body, so vice versa the order and connection of the 
affections of the body occurs in just the way that thoughts and the ideas of things are 
arranged and connected in the mind” (p.203).   
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Proposition 2: “If we remove an agitation of the mind, or emotion, from the 
thought of its external cause, and join it to other thoughts, then love or hatred towards the 
external cause, and also vacillations, that arise from these emotions will be destroyed.”   
Proposition 3: “A passive emotion ceases to be a passive emotion as soon as we 
form a clear and distinct idea of it.” And further: “A passive emotion is a confused idea. 
So if we form a clear and distinct idea of the emotion, this idea is distinguishable only in 
concept from the emotion in so far as the latter is related only to mind; and so the emotion 
will cease to be passive.” (p.204).  
Proposition 4: “There is no affection of the body which we cannot form a clear 
and distinct conception”, and further explains: “What is common in all things can only be 
conceived adequately and thus there is no affection of the body which we cannot form a 
clear and distinct conception…hence it follows that there is no emotion of which we 
cannot form a clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is the idea of an affection of 
the body, which must therefore involve some clear and distinct conception.”   
In the Scholium of Proposition 4, Spinoza maps out a way to understand and 
conceptualize the affections as a way of distancing ourselves from their emotional 
effects:   
Everyone has the power of clearly and distinctly understanding himself and his 
emotions, if not absolutely, at least in part, and consequently of bringing it about 
that he should be less passive in respect of them…In this way all appetites or 
desires are passive emotions only in so far as they arise from inadequate ideas, 
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and they are accredited to virtue when they are aroused or generated by adequate 
ideas (p.205).  
So in this paragraph the affect is my transition, from the enclosed hopelessness to 
the force of walking away open minded, from standing in the empty space to throwing a 
rock through the window, these are just two examples of the transitions or durations of 
affect. But affect as Deleuze (1988) explains is wholly related to these images but not 
reducible to them or: “it is certain that the affect implies an image or idea, and follows 
from the latter as from its cause. But it is not confined to the image or idea; it is of 
another nature, being purely transitive, and not indicative or representative, since it is 
experienced in a lived duration that involves the difference between two states.” Therefor 
the transitions stated above enclosed/open and standing/throwing are the result of affect, 
what happens between them is the affect itself, and the access given to this space of 
transition or affect, is one of images and ideas as traces which relate to affect in specific 
ways but are not as Spinoza has outlined in the mentioned propositions, themselves 
affect. Thus affect seems to have more in common with desire or conatus, but not as a 
desire of free will but as an opening up of capacities, more of a fine tuning of larger 
external forces into fine-tuned intensities.   
The moment of being in the empty space, my association with the empty factories 
and railway yards produce an order of images that act as “agitations” which produce 
“passive emotions”, passive because there is series of causes that I misunderstand 
because I am making judgments based on inadequate ideas. All of this confusion creates a 
containment that reflects and distorts my ability to act and to think; thus my “enclosure” 
is me reducing myself and my capacity to affect and be affected. The major 
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misunderstanding here is that the production of capitalism, which is the reason for these 
empty spaces that I am experiencing, is the only form of production at work here, and it is 
when I realize the inadequate notions of this idea and the images it produces that I begin 
to open up, stretch out my capacity to act and to think, or essentially to be affected.        
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CHAPTER FIVE  
Propositions on the Nature of Affect   
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The Ethics appears at first to be a continuous stream of definitions, 
propositions, proofs, and corollaries, presenting us with a remarkable 
development of concepts. An irresistible, uninterrupted river, majestically 
serene. Yet all the while there are ‘parentheses’ springing up in the guise 
of scholia, discontinuously, independently, referring to one another, 
violently erupting to form a broken volcanic chain, as all the passions 
rumble below in a war of joys pitted against sadness. These scholia might 
seem to fit into the overall conceptual development, but they don't: they're 
more like a second Ethics, running parallel to the first but with a 
completely different rhythm, a completely different tone, echoing the 
movement of concepts in the full force of affects. And then there's a third 
Ethics, too, when we come to Book Five. Because Spinoza tells us that up 
to that point he's been speaking from the viewpoint of concepts, but now 
he's going to change his style and speak directly and intuitively in pure 
percepts. Here too, one might imagine he's still proving things, but he's 
certainly not continuing the same way. The line of proof begins to leap 
like lightning across gaps, proceeding elliptically, implicitly, in 
abbreviated form, advancing in piercing, rending flashes. No longer a 
river, or something running below the surface, but fire. A third Ethics that, 
although it appears only at the close, is there from the start, along with the 
other two…We need both wings, as Jaspers would say, just to carry us, 
philosophers and non philosophers toward the same limiting point. And it 
takes all three wings, nothing less, to form a style, a bird of fire. (Gilles  
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Deleuze, 1989, 165-166)  
The quote above elicits the importance of method when it comes to affect, 
because as Deleuze makes clear, affects are always present in any written form, whether 
explicit or subtle. The style or method of this thesis has been in the direction of a 
generative ontology: First the experiences of student-teacher relationships themselves as 
encounters of bodies, which produced and constituted the selected artefacts, followed by 
an encounter with the artefacts expressed through evocative writing, to yet another 
encounter with the open fragments and movements of images through generative 
concepts covered in Chapter 4. Now to the question of do I continue to move up, carried 
in the current of affects, or do I fold it into a systematic series of concepts to be 
institutionalized? Do I draw summative conceptual conclusions or continue in the 
expressive mode of Chapter 4? Once these methodological questions are addressed what 
then do I say regarding the affects? And which ones? The ones of my past that I re-
experience through traces of images? Or the affects produced in this writing and no less 
in the reading of this work. And if so what are they doing? How are they functioning?   
The method up to this point has been wholly based on the understanding that the 
affects remain wholly just outside of the analysis, that is to say, as a river only to be 
scooped up and examined by the concepts used to structure an articulation of the nature 
of these moving affects, and to draw some conclusions regarding this process is to come 
to terms with how best to do this regarding both the affects of my past experiences and 
now in their current expressed form. Affect is thus always in surplus and always positive  
(that is without negation). Thus a relationship based on affect is one based in surplus and 
positivity. So what follows here is not a summative or final conclusion but a threshold. 
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Here is what I know about affect and what I think can help build contexts, both institutional 
and ontological, in which relations of affect can be born in beyond the “limiting point” of 
sadness, as the joyous “bird of fire”.        
Regarding the nature of concepts and affects as referred to in the quote above, 
leads me to conclude that there are really two theses here. One thesis is centered on the 
affects generated or provoked by the artefacts and articulated by the evocative writing. 
This thesis is an expression of pure intensity parallel with a wail or a laugh; this thesis 
consists of the things expressed in the artefacts which were left untouched conceptually in 
Chapter 4. These are the affects left to speak for themselves as fragments and thresholds 
gone unanalyzed. The second thesis, is the thinking thesis, the fragments captured in 
Chapter 4 and transformed into concepts that act as an attempt to understand what affect 
needs to function contextually.  The affects of the relationships that constituted these 
artefacts, the relationships of teachers and students of my past, are gone in their 
magnitude. Some people are dead, some people have gone away, some I’m sure are still 
lingering around, but the affects we had and the relationships we had in the moments we 
had them are gone. Their full force has slipped away. All I have here are traces of images 
of the strongest affects that linger with me still. Not only still present in a new form (a 
series of images constituted by language), but also producing whole new affects in 
themselves that I must come to terms with and learn to direct in ontologically 
constructive ways, to steer me towards Joy and life. Not just what affects were produced 
but how do I deal with them now? How do I use them in present? And how do I help and 
connect with others and what kind of relationship does one based on affect look like?  
The final conclusion or resolution I make regarding the traversing of imminent  
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Spinozist production and capitalist command and appropriation of it, regarding Artefact 
6b, is an important site of affect. It was in this excerpt of evocative writing that I came to 
terms with the empty factories of capitalist production as superficial forms of immanent 
production. This was done through the conceptual extraction of images as traces in 
context of my desire, from an individual attempting to ‘will’ themselves against a hostile 
form of production, to a mode which opens up itself to the affections and affects of an 
ontologically positive production. This shift of traces is important because it does not act 
as a resolution in the sense that the chapter can be closed but is in fact an axiom, or a 
rearrangement of images and traces that must become productive, a new set of images as 
parameters that are constantly and immanently unraveling. This chapter is an attempt to 
seize on that moment as a spark and produce a flame, send me off not in a comfortable 
state of knowingness but with a new found capacity for affections. The excerpted 
paragraph from chapter 6b is a rupture, one that I must reassess and push further. Perhaps 
I have just begun to push past the basic assumptions and into ontological grounds, and I 
want to take the time here to continue this trajectory into ontological territory that opens 
up more doors for future work on affect and ontology. Then I will finish with a series of 
propositions of what I believe can act as a preliminary set of axioms for an ontologically 
grounded version of a Pedagogy of Affect.   
Affect as Duration  
Deleuze (1988) makes a distinction between two different forms of affects. The 
first is affect as passions/actions and the second is affect as capacity of/ability of. Both of 
these sprout the most challenging conceptual element regarding affect, that being the role 
of time, affect and essence. As expressed in artefact 4b, every affect is different and 
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contingent. It is as an expression of specific affections or assemblages of bodies and is 
gone or transformed into something else of lesser or greater power. But this observation 
in itself has assumptions that are problematic and that need to be further analyzed and 
discussed. The main assumptions are that affect plays by the rules of standard time, here 
and then there as two separate states rather then what really is which is a “continuance 
line of variation” or duration. First let us go back to the relationship between affect and 
language generated from artefact 4 and further expressed conceptually in chapter 4.   
The main myth discovered in the analysis of artefact 4 is regarding language and 
its role with affect. The assumption behind the structure of the lesson template is that 
affects happen and can then be codified into language. The lesson template is an attempt 
to design a machine that captures affects and then puts them into words that strategies 
ways to generate the captured affect. But as was expressed in chapter 4b, any attempt to 
articulate a specific affect is just a production of a new affect and the reading of that 
language just produces further affects that are different affects from the ones that 
conceived it. The common dominator here is that affect is a force behind these actions, an 
inarticulate force that language attempts to order and command but is always out 
maneuvered, the affect is always in surplus, never fully captured; this what Deleuze  
(1988) means when he claims that “An idea of affections always gives rise to affects” 
(p.51). Indeed affects are always here, and are always in different forms and at different 
speeds and as soon as we reflect on them and attempt to put them into language they have 
changed. Affect thus cannot be reduced fully to a quantity or a static image because the 
production of this representation is a new affect and the reading or observation of it is in 
itself a new affect.   
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This fleeting and changing conception of affect is consistent with what was 
discussed briefly in Chapter 2, namely how affect and duration are always “at one’s 
back”, as Deleuze puts it. No matter how fast our comprehension or articulate our 
language, there is always a space beyond our understanding, moments of affect that 
remain present but always fleeting. If affect is fire, then all we have are its sparks and 
smoke as traces of images. This does not mean, however, that we cannot grasp at 
understanding the general nature of the flame, in regards to what feeds it and what starves 
it, in an attempt to turn ourselves towards it in order to channel it, ride it out as a force.   
Deleuze (1988) describes the duration of affect as passages: “Therefore, from one 
state to another, from one image or idea to another, there are transitions, passages that are 
experienced, durations through which we pass to a greater or lesser perfection” (p.48), 
and now more importantly Deleuze adds here: “these states, these affections, images or 
ideas are not severable from the duration that attaches them to the preceding state and 
makes them tend towards the next state. These continual durations or variations of 
perfection are called ‘affects’ or feelings (affectus)” (p.48-49). So not only does duration 
happen in sequence of images/ideas/affections from one state to another but also has no 
end but only a beginning, and is in direct contrast to death: “Now neither the essence of 
the thing nor the efficient cause that posits its existence can assign an end to its duration. 
This is why duration by itself is an indefinite continuation of existing: The end of a 
duration, which is to say, death, comes from the encounter of the existing mode with 
another mode that decomposes its relation” (p.62). Therefore when death occurs duration 
ceases, but that is not to say that duration is therefore destined, as if duration is set to 
expire from the beginning, meaning our time does not just run out when death occurs as 
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some clock ticking down, but rather our death is simply the overcoming of another cause 
which decomposes our vital relations; thus we do not lack time in death.    
So the power of duration is not only the “lived transitions [of a mode] that define 
its affects” or the “continual variations of the existing mode’s power of acting” but also 
includes a new definition of time, one that is corporeal, contingent, and experienced. This 
can be further conceived as Deleuze contrasts duration with eternity: “Eternity [is] neither 
an indefinite duration nor something that begins after duration, but it coexists with 
duration, just as two parts of ourselves that differ in nature coexist, the part that involves 
the existence of the body and the part that expresses its essence” (p.63). Thus there are 
two modes of time, that which pertains to the corporeal body and its affections as 
duration, and that which expresses its essence or degree of power as eternity. This double 
existence is not a negation but a positive co-existence. This dual temporal existence of 
eternity/duration also parallels affect as capacity/ability, and the transition of affect as a 
passion vs affect as an action. Once again Deleuze explains this dual nature of time as an 
expression of existence and an expression of essence within the context of ideas:  
But if the idea is adequate instead of being a confused image, if it directly 
expresses the essence of the affecting body instead of involving it indirectly to 
our state, if it is the idea of an internal affection, or of a self-affection that 
envinces the internal agreement of our essence, other essences, and the essence of 
God (3rd kind of knowledge), then the affects that arise from it are themselves 
actions. Not only must these affects or feelings be joys or loves, they must be 
quite special  
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joys and loves since they are no longer defined by an increase of our perfection or 
power of acting but by full, formal possession of that power or perfection. The 
word blessedness should be reserved for these active joys: they appear to conquer 
and extend themselves within duration, like the passive joys, but in fact they are 
eternal and are no longer explained by duration; they no longer imply transitions 
and passages, but express themselves and one another in an eternal mode, 
together with the adequate ideas from which they issue. (p.51)  
This quote above outlines how affect can become more than duration or existence and 
become ability/capacity from passive/active from duration/eternal through adequate 
ideas. An affective pedagogy that remains resolute in maintaining a Spinozist ontology 
thus means it must pivot around the ambition of making a temporal transformation, from 
affect as a transition of passive abilities to an essence of actions within expanding 
capacity.   
The second conclusion is that affect as duration and as eternity brings up an 
important distinction: how we manage affect as a concept is one thing but how we 
manage it materially in our lives is another, one that means revaluating our idea of time 
and the empirical instruments we use to measure and understand our environment. To put 
it another way, how do we enact a Pedagogy of Affect with the understanding that we 
cannot reduce affect to a number or a word so to engage with it as manipulative thing? In 
this context affect is something that is always here but never the same, thus always 
fleeting. To this one could ask “if affect is so contingent then what is the point?” The 
point is, of course, that affect is knowable, just not with standard tools that rely on 
language as an ordering or time as linear over space, but instead with tools that rely on 
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language as expression, or at least go about ordering so as to create spaces for expression, 
and temporal engagements as subjective and varying, and to do this in the felid of 
Affective Pedagogy it is clear we must use new ontological tools. We cannot reduce 
affect to tiny spaces or large spaces, that is to say, we cannot use tools that look to the 
past for affect but rather tools for the present or the future. Seizing on the power of 
affect/affections is a temporal and corporeal project, thus one that must happen in the 
present and looks towards the future.   
Conatus: from will to desire to the Common  
The concept of conatus was discussed in Chapter 2 and more thoroughly in 
Chapter 4 regarding my excerpted paragraph from artefact 6b. I want to return to it now 
because it holds some significance in terms of taking on the questions that affect and 
duration produce, as well as the problems posed in the preliminary questions, such as how 
is it that a Pedagogy of Affect deals with “free will” and all the presumptions of 
individualism and contractualism that it inspires. More specifically, how do we manage 
the juxtaposition of recognizing the limitations of being a mode with only fragmentary 
understandings of our cause and effects, while also attempting to direct oneself towards 
affects/affections of joy. So exactly what can we control as individuals in a sea of causes 
and effects and adequate and inadequate forms of knowledge? Of course this question is 
puzzling and easily falls into the dialectic of individual/community contractualism 
precisely because it relies on the individual as a concept, and it is this concept that must 
be used to pivot Affective Pedagogy away from such presumptions. Spinoza’s work, 
especially Book V, outlines how it is that one navigates affects and emotions. Negri  
(2013) specifically points out how:   
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I have now reviewed all the remedies against the emotions, or all that the mind, 
considered in itself alone, can do against them. Whence it appears that the mind’s 
power over the emotions consists:  
I. In actual knowledge of the emotions.  
II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an external 
cause, which we conceive confusedly.   
III. In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions referred to things, which 
we distinctly understand, surpass those referred to what we conceive in a 
confused and fragmented manner.  
IV. In the multitude of causes whereby those modifications are fostered, 
which have regard to the common properties of things or to God.  
V. Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and associate, one with 
another, its own emotions. (p.89)  
This “remedy of the emotions”, as Negri words it, is similar to the attempt on my part in 
chapter 4 to re-associate images and traces with my own desire, from that of lack to that 
of positive production, from an individual to a singularity, by navigating my past 
encounters of affect that have left the most permanent traces on me. What Negri makes 
explicitly clear is that these individual remedies must transcend beyond the individual 
itself or “far beyond any conception of individual interrelations: it presents itself as a 
movement entirely aimed at the construction of the common...the common determines the 
constituent motor of the ontological process” (p.94).    
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In their work, Commonwealth (2009), Hardt and Negri outline this transformation 
of individual desire into common in more detail:  
at the level of sensations he identifies a striving (conatus) of and for life; this 
striving is built upon and directed in desire (cupiditas), which functions through 
the affects: and desire in turn is strengthened and affirmed in love (amor), which 
operates in reason. The movement of this sequence involves not negation – 
striving is not negated by desire, or desire by love – but rather a progressive 
accumulation, such that desire and love are increasingly powerful strivings for 
life. And this process is immediately political since the object of all the terms of 
this sequence is the formation of collective social life and, more generally, the 
constitution of the common. (p.192)    
Within this “Spinozian geometrical sequence”, as Hardt and Negri (2009) refer to it, lays 
the foundation for building student-teacher relationships beyond standard contractual 
relationships and into something more dynamic, from static definitions of class, race, and 
gender to a dynamic becoming based in the positive striving of life for life’s sake. This 
new mode of relations is what constitutes the multitude as referred to in artefact 3b, and 
in this new dynamic relation, lack disappears, the individual disappears and something  
further still: time itself.      
Spinoza further articulates in Part III prop 9, sch., how this engagement of conatus 
and cupiditas relates to individual conceptions of desire:     
When this conatus is related to the mind alone, it is called Will (voluntas); when it 
is related to mind and body together, it is called Appetite (appetitus), which is 
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therefore nothing else but man’s essence, from the nature of which there 
necessarily follow those things that tend to his preservation, and which man is this 
determined to perform.  
Thus the nature of desire as the outcome of conatus, in sequence with how ‘will’ remains 
within the mind and ‘appetite’ within the body as reductions of desire through the 
concept of the individual. The power of desire, according to Spinoza, thus takes place in 
its ability to express conatus, which itself seeks the perseverance of itself; therefore true 
fulfilment of conatus is a wholly communal act beyond the individual. Spinoza also 
makes some important distinctions regarding conatus and time as duration/eternity in the 
following: “The conatus with which each single thing endeavors to persist in its own 
being does not involve finite time, but indefinite time” (Part III, prop 8). As Deleuze  
(1988) further writes, “once the mode is determined to exist, that is, to subsume under its 
relation an infinity of extensive parts. To persevere is to endure; hence the conatus 
involves an indefinite duration” (p.98-99). In this context, a truly ontological Pedagogy 
of Affect must push further beyond existence to essence, duration to eternity, ability to 
capacity, desire to love, individual to the common, in order to constitute not only a truly 
ontologically constituted mode of relations based in affect, but also any form or practices 
of youth/adult relations based in liberation.      
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Propositions for an Ontological Pedagogy of Affect  
Affect  
I. Affect is a mode of thought.  
II. Affections are the encounters of bodies.  
III. Affect is composed of images/ideas of bodies and encounters.   
IV. Affect is duration between two states.   
V. Affect is not reducible to space or time.  
VI. Affect is produced by ideas of bodies both present and absent.  
VII. Affects are contingent and idiosyncratic.  
VIII. Affects are universal in action and singular in expression.    
IX. Affects are always in surplus and can never be fully reduced to an 
expression or an articulation.  
X. Affects can be Joyful or Sad but are experienced in infinite expressions and 
articulations.   
XI. The larger the capacity for affect (both in the mind and body) the more able 
one is to navigate the good/bad affects.  
XII. A Pedagogy of affect is a mode of relations that are directed towards 
expanding the capacities to affect and be affected of the teacher and students 
in relation.   
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The Student-Teacher  
XIII. The teacher is any person or group that has a larger capacity to think or act 
at any moment or in any context.  
XIV. The student is any one person or group who has the lesser capacity to think 
or act at any one moment in any given context.  
XV. Both Student and Teacher are created through function/action.  
XVI. Teacher/Student is a relation among bodies that expresses itself through  
affections and affects.   
XVII. A classroom is the physical or transcendent space in which the relations of  
students and teachers are expressed or articulated.   
XVIII. Pedagogy is the theory that encompasses sets of relations and the encounters  
of bodies that produce them.  
XIX. Theory is language used to construct/reconstruct experiences of meaning in 
response to problems.   
XX. Theory thus must be reposed and reapplied as different problems are 
expressed through different material encounters.   
Language  
XXI. Language is communication between bodies.  
XXII. Articulation is an act of language that attempts to command/order the 
affects.  
XXIII. Expression is an act of language that is both generated by affect and 
generates  
affect.   
XXIV. Adequate/Inadequate knowledge is composed of images and language.  
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XXV. The given capacity of thought (as ideas of the body) are composed of  
inadequate and adequate ideas.  
XXVI. Inadequate ideas are myths or superstitions, which block the full 
engagement  
of affect and reduces the capacity for/of affect.   
XXVII. The more one knows about the context of students and teachers (history,  
culture ect.), the more adequate the ideas and thus the more powerful ones 
decisions are in the classroom.  
XXVIII. Both adequate ideas and inadequate ideas can be communicated through  
expressions or articulations.  
Power  
XXIX. The greatest power is the immanent production of life for life’s own sake.  
XXX. The power of life is generative and expansive so any “power” that attempts to  
reduce or limit itself is a corrupt power.  
XXXI. The expression of immanent power is ontologically constituted but is also  
under constant ordering/commanding by larger forces which seek to 
appropriate it. This process of ordering and appropriation is oppression.  
XXXII. The fundamental goal of affective pedagogy is to release those involved of  
having their immediate interactions sabotaged by corrupting forces, and 
instead rearranged to have expressions/articulations and relationships based 
on the affects of the teacher/students immediately involved.  
Liberation  
XXXIII. Assemblages or orientations of power based on the necessary sadness of 
those  
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involved are corrupt versions of a greater power (Power of life) and are by 
function; oppressive.  
XXXIV. No matter how expansive over space and time an oppressive assemblage or  
orientation of power is, it is always passed through time and space via the  
affects, and is thus wholly reliant on the material expression of their 
superstitions/myths by the bodies that compose them.   
XXXV. Liberation is the act of ontologically generating joyful affects and 
reengaging  
students/teachers with processes of language and action (mind/body) in 
generative expressive forms through the articulation of adequate knowledge.  
XXXVI. Reducing desire to ‘will’ (of the mind) or ‘appetite’ (of the body) is done  
through the myth of the individual and is thus the reduction of a complex 
mode of relations to that of a slave (A-Teacher or A-Student).  
XXXVII. Teachers and students must act in solidarity through the expansion of their  
capacity to affect and be affected, which is done through communal acts and 
through the delimitation of the individual, which then turns desire into acts of  
Joy and acts of Love, towards the Common.  
XXXVIII. The only way to truly liberate a student/teacher from assemblages of  
oppression, is through ontological expression of the affects, which is 
constituted by love of its essence as a degree of power within the immanent 
production of life.    
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